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ABSTRACT 
 
Environmental impact assessments (EIAs) are recognized as a vital planning tool in 
insuring the sustainable development of resource dependent communities. However, 
critics point out that the lack of efficiency and efficacy in the process impedes EIAs full 
potential. One dynamic often criticized for hindering this potential is politics, while there 
is a consensus that EIAs are inherently political how politics impacts the process is still 
poorly understood. Part of this is attributed to the limited EIA literature studying the root 
of politics: power. This thesis will study power and politics in EIA by using an analytical 
framework based on Anthony Giddens’s structuration theory to examine the impacts of 
macro political structures on stakeholder dynamics. By conducting an in-depth 
comparative case study on two EIAs for mining projects, one in Northern Saskatchewan 
and one in Northern Norway, this thesis identifies that indigenous peoples in the Northern 
Saskatchewan case had more influence on the EIA process than their Norwegian 
counterparts, while the local level government in the Norwegian case had more 
opportunities to influence the EIA process than the local governments in Northern 
Saskatchewan. The study finds that these differences can largely be attributed to 
differences in the macro political structures, such as indigenous rights and the authority 
of different levels of governance, in each country.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
Natural resource wealth continues to drive global interest in Arctic and sub-Arctic 
regions.  Although commodity prices—especially oil and iron ore—have fallen over the 
past year, the long-term trend will see an increasing demand for Northern energy and 
mineral resources. Northern residents have expressed concerns that profits will flow 
South and that irreversible socio-economic and environmental damages will stay in the 
North (Bone 2012).  Northern communities demand a greater say in the development of 
Northern resources and seek a future that promotes sustainable development in the 
resource sector.   
Northern economies based on resource extraction industries face an inherent 
conundrum: mineral and energy resources are finite, non-renewable, and, although they 
generate considerable wealth in the short- to mid-term, are not self-sustaining in the long-
term. Hence, the mining industry is viewed as part, rather than the whole, of a sustainable 
development chain (Brundtland 1987). The resource sector’s sustainable development 
chain starts with Northern communities located near the resource extraction sites, it then 
extends through supply and support hub centres, and finally ends at larger economic and 
political capitals.  If there is a break in the chain, the sustainability for everyone involved 
is at risk.   
This thesis is part of a larger project concerned with the relationship of Northern 
communities in this sustainability chain. The project focuses on three key contributing 
factors to sustainable resource development: corporate social responsibility (CSR), 
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capacity building, and environmental impact assessments (EIAs). This thesis focuses on 
the role of EIA through a comparative North-to-North study of Northern Norway and 
Northern Saskatchewan.   
EIAs are a planning tool that help inform decision-makers on the potential 
environmental impacts of a proposed action (Noble 2015; Hanna 2009). The purpose of 
EIAs is not to reject or approve a particular action; rather, it is to ensure that decision-
makers are aware of the implications and have the tools to help minimize, mitigate, or 
remediate adverse impacts (Noble 2015; Hanna 2009). Saskatchewan and Norway 
require EIAs for large resource projects that risk negatively impacting the environment.  
These project-based EIAs are a critical point in the sustainability chain. They 
influence whether or not government officials allow a mining project to proceed and, if it 
does, what conditions are imposed. The approval or rejection of a mining development 
impacts the long-term socioeconomic outcomes of Northern communities. Additionally, 
it affects larger regional hubs and national economies that have the potential to benefit 
from resource sector activity. 
EIAs for large mining projects are extremely arduous. The North’s fragile 
ecosystems and unique socioeconomic dynamics compound the difficulties inherent to 
this process (Hermansen 2015). The complex and often controversial proposed mines in 
the North cause EIAs to be taxing on companies, communities, and government agencies 
alike. The entire EIA process generally takes several years to complete.  Despite these 
challenges, Northern communities regard the process as an essential tool for ensuring 
their issues and concerns are addressed. The public consultation process, a broad 
definition of the term ‘environment’, and the perceived political clout of the process are 
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some of the important drivers that have kept this process relevant. Living up to the 
public’s expectation of community involvement and engagement in the EIA process 
continues to be an immense challenge in both Northern Norway and Northern 
Saskatchewan. Each region can learn from the successes and failures of the other.   
The political component of EIA creates many challenges and inefficiencies in the 
process. EIAs are by design a neutral, science-based tool that generates impartial 
information on the impacts of a proposed project. In practice they do not and cannot live 
up to this description. EIAs are intrinsically political (Fisher 2015; Runhaar and Harts 
2015). The majority of practitioners and researchers agree with this statement; however, 
there is little understanding on how politics operate within EIAs (Cashmore and 
Richardson 2013). Research on the impacts of larger political structures and power 
relations on the politics within the EIA is still in its infancy (Cashmore and Richardson 
2013). Understanding how politics and power impact the EIA process is vital for frontline 
communities because their agency is critical for sustainable development. 
Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of current 
generations while not compromising the needs of future generations (Bruntdland 1987). 
Governments, industry, and communities often use this term when discussing the mining 
industry, which – with its boom-bust cycle – has a notorious reputation for being 
unsustainable. Studies tackling sustainable development in the mining industry emphasise 
the importance of community involvement and agency in the decision making process 
(Azapagic 2004; Kemp 2010; Glucker et al. 2013; Sinclair, Diduck, and Fitzpatrick 
2008). Due to the importance of community engagement, this thesis will focus on the 
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community-level aspects of EIAs by examining the role of local and indigenous 
governance in the EIA process in Northern Norway and Northern Saskatchewan.  
Preliminary data collection for this thesis suggested that in Northern Norway 
municipalities play a much larger role and have more influence in the EIA process than 
indigenous groups. In Northern Saskatchewan preliminary data collection suggested the 
opposite– indigenous groups were more powerful than their municipal counterparts. This 
thesis will explore how political structures and resources can enable certain actors to 
exert power and have a more influential role in the EIA process than others.  
1.2 Research Question 
This thesis will investigate the following question:  
 Do political structures impact how groups in frontline communities influence the 
EIA process, and if so how?  
1.3 Case Studies 
This study will focus on the Northern Administration District (NAD) (see Figure 1.1) of 
Saskatchewan and the Finnmark County of Norway as comparative referents. These two 
regions are the focus of the larger project that this thesis is a part of. These administrative 
districts do not oversee of administer EIAs, however focussing on regional areas 
establishes cultural, political, and socioeconomic context that is unique to these Northern 
regions.   
There are several reasons why NAD and Finnmark Country are strong choices as 
comparative referents. Both are located in the circumpolar North, they are within Western 
liberal democracies, contain extant mining activity, have long-standing EIA policies, and 
are homelands to large indigenous populations.  Importantly, in both regions the question 
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of sustainable development in the mining industry is an important dimension of public 
debate. The following two sections provide political and socioeconomic context for each 
case study region.  
1.3.1 Northern Saskatchewan 
At 268,390 square km, the NAD in Saskatchewan accounts for nearly half of the 
province’s territorial expanse (Statistics Canada 2012).  As of 2011, the NAD had a 
population of 36,557; its two largest towns La Loche and La Ronge, had populations of 
2,611 and 2,304 respectively (Statistics Canada 2012; Government of Saskatchewan 
2015). There are approximately 45 communities in the area (Statistics Canada 2012; 
Government of Saskatchewan 2015). The NAD is 85.6% aboriginal with the majority 
identifying as Cree, Dene, and Métis (Government of Saskatchewan 2015). Two-thirds of 
its total population are under 35 years of age (Government of Saskatchewan 2015).  
The region is resource rich and heavily dependent on industry, particularly 
mining. In 2011, the mining industry in Northern Saskatchewan contributed 1.4 billion 
dollars to the provincial economy (NDMF 2013). Uranium mining is the most prosperous 
industry in the region, accounting for 17% of worldwide uranium production in 2011 
(NDMF 2013). Gold mining and rare earth elements exploration are also present in the 
area (NDMF 2013). 
Governance in the region operates on a four-tiered system with federal, 
provincial, and local governments, as well as indigenous governance1 systems each 
                                                
1 Indigenous governance systems in Canada are exceedingly complex with multiple 
organizations at each level of government (federal, provincial, regional, local). In this 
thesis, I will focus specifically on local indigenous governance systems in Canada (First 
Nations bands, and Métis Locals) because they play a large role in the EIA process.   
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having different roles and responsibilities. There are three types of municipalities in the 
NAD: Northern towns, Northern villages and Northern hamlets. These municipalities 
have elected councils and are responsible for local administrative issues, such as roads 
and fire services, within their community boundaries. In addition to the three types of 
municipalities, the NAD also has northern settlements. Northern settlements elect a local 
advisory board that reports to the Minister of Government Relations. Ultimately, the 
province is responsible for the management of local services and administration of 
Northern settlements. Both Northern municipalities and Northern settlements are 
governed in accordance with the province’s Northern Municipalities Act, 2010 and are a 
provincial responsibility.  The major municipal players in the Northern Saskatchewan 
case study are Patuanak, a Northern hamlet, and Pinehouse, a Northern village. First 
Nation bands, such as English River First Nation (ERFN), have a similar administrative 
role as northern municipalities. They too have an elected council responsible for 
managing the day-to-day affairs of the band but unlike municipalities, they are governed 
in accordance with the Indian Act and are a federal responsibility.  
 Local level Métis governance systems are called Locals. They are currently not 
recognized as government institutions but rather regarded as ‘organizations’ and do not 
have a federally delegated administrative role (Madden, Graham, and Wilson 2005). 
Despite the lack of self-government recognition Métis locals are important actors 
politically and culturally in the region. They play a prominent role in the resource 
development processes in Northern Saskatchewan.  
The provincial government and federal government have a broader set of 
responsibilities, for example the provincial government manages managing natural 
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resources. The federal government is responsible for fisheries, migratory species, and 
indigenous affairs. 
 In Canada, environmental regulation is multi-jurisdictional at the federal, 
provincial, and territorial level (Hanna 2009; Hickey, Brunet, and Allan 2010; Noble 
2015).  Additionally, certain aboriginal land claim agreements, such as the James Bay 
and Northern Quebec Agreement, include provision for regulatory control over EIAs 
(Noble 2015). Each order of government has separate legislation: the Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA) (Government of Canada, 2012) and the 
Environmental Assessment Act (Government of Saskatchewan 2013). Often a major 
undertaking will be subject to both acts. When this happens, federal and provincial 
authorities have three potential routes2.  They can jointly conduct an EIA, one 
government can delegate part of the EIA process to the other, or the federal EIA can be 
substituted by another jurisdictional EIA3 (Noble 2015). In each situation the public and 
proponent undergo a single EIA, but the two levels of government retain independent 
decision making over issues that are under their jurisdiction (Minister of the Environment 
2014).  In other words, one project equals one assessment (Noble 2015; Hanna 2009).  
 In addition to consultation as part of EA legislation, the Crown4 is constitutionally 
obligated to meaningfully consult with aboriginal peoples when a proposed project has 
the potential to impact their original rights to practice traditional activities on their 
territories. Generally, consultation occurs during the public participation component of an 
                                                
2 Certain projects, such as uranium mines, cannot be delegated or substituted 
3 The option to delegate part of an EIA or to substitute an EIA using equivalency were 
added when the new CEAA was introduced in 2012 (Noble 2015)  
4 In Canada ‘the Crown’ refers to either a provincial government or the federal 
government 
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EIA. Both federal and provincial governments have developed guidelines to aid 
government officials and proponents in the consultation process, specifically: Aboriginal 
Consultation and Accommodation (Canada and Aboriginal Affairs and Northern 
Development Canada 2011) and Proponents Guide: Consultation with First Nations and 
Métis in Saskatchewan Environmental Impact Assessment.  
Figure 1.1 Map of NAD 
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1.3.2 Northern Norway 
Finnmark County (see Figure 1.2) is Norway’s northernmost county. Spanning a total of 
48, 649 square km, it is also the largest (Finnmark County Authority 2010). Currently, 
the county has approximately 75, 600, inhabitants; its largest towns are Alta at 19, 800 
inhabitants, Hammerfest at 10, 300 inhabitants, and Kirkenes (municipality of Sør-
Varanger) at 10, 000 inhabitants (Statistics Norway 2015). Finnmark County is rich in 
resources and relies heavily on revenue generated from oil and gas, mining, and fisheries 
(FCA 2010). Reindeer farming, fish farming, tourism, and public service round out the 
rest of the economic activity in the area (FCA 2010). In the coming years, unreliable oil 
and gas prices will push Norway to diversify its economy, making mining an even more 
important industry and issue in the area. 
 Finnmark County is Norway’s most valuable mining region. Iron ore, nepheline 
syenite, Alta slate, and quartzite are all mined in the region (FCA 2010). Mining projects 
are a polarising issue in the area because, although they bring much needed economic 
activity, they risk compromising traditional reindeer husbandry and polluting the local 
fjords (Magga 2015; Nilsen 2015; Fjellheim 2015). Critics of the mining industry argue 
that companies are using high unemployment rates in the region as leverage for getting 
mining projects approved (Borgenvik 2014). Mining is not the only industry in the area 
interested in using large portions of Northern landscape (Fjellheim 2015; Nygaard 2015). 
Energy projects and reindeer herding compound demands for land use in the North 
creating conflicts that are huge strain for municipalities and local Sami (Nygaard 2015; 
Fjellheim 2015).  
Governance in Norway operates on a three-tiered system: national, regional 
(county), and local (municipal). The term municipality in Norway is not akin to the term 
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municipality in Canada. Spatially municipalities in Norway are, generally, the equivalent 
of “counties” in rural Canada albeit with the administrative duties and structure of a 
municipal/local government.  In rural Norway, multiple small communities within a 
designated geographic boundary make up a single municipality. These communities may 
have some form of independent governance; however, municipalities are considered the 
‘atomic unit’ of local governance (Davidrajuh 2010).  Unlike Northern Saskatchewan, the 
majority of the territory of Northern Norway lies within the boundaries of all the 
municipalities. Norwegian municipalities are responsible for local issues within their 
jurisdiction such as education, outpatient health care, and transit infrastructure 
(Davidrajuh 2010; Trasti 2015; Wartiainen, 2015).  They play a large role in the 
economic planning and zoning of their district including resource management 
(Davidrajuh 2010; Fauchald 2014).  
Counties are responsible for regional governance. Their responsibilities include 
education, regional infrastructure, and economic and cultural development. There are 19 
counties in Norway. Historically, Finnmark County has had the same administrative 
duties as its Southern counterparts; however, this changed in 2005 when the Norwegian 
government enacted the Finnmark Act (Norwegian Government 2005). This act 
transferred 95% of the county’s land to its inhabitants, giving Finnmark additional 
powers with regards to land management – particularly hunting and fishing (Asbjørnsen 
2015). The Finnmark Estate, which has Sami and non-Sami representatives, manages 
these lands. Despite this transfer of land and authority, the Norwegian government retains 
the majority of mineral rights (Nygaard 2015).  
  11 
As a unitary state, the Norwegian government is the final authority on all matters 
of government. The state plays a major role in resource management by legislating 
mining policy and environmental regulations as well as authorizing permits for resource 
extraction.   
Norway’s primary legislation regarding EIA regulation is the Planning and 
Building Act (Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) 2003). There 
are also additional assessment provisions set out in the Pollution Control Act and the 
Petroleum Act (Henriksen, Gormley, and Nilsen 2012). International standards influence 
Norway’s EIA legislation. As a member of the European Economic Area, Norway has 
adopted the provisions in the European Union (EU) Directive on Environmental Impact 
Assessment and follows the requirements set out in the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe (UNECE) Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a 
Transboundary Context (NORAD 2003; Henriksen, Gormley, and Nilsen 2012). The 
Norwegian government and its relevant ministries, Mining Authority, Ministry of 
Environment (MoE), Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation, and the 
Directorate for Fisheries that oversee EIA are the final authority on the subject. However, 
because municipalities have core responsibilities with regards to strategic planning and 
EIAs fall under the Planning and Building Act municipalities in Norway play a major 
regulatory role in the EIA process (Nygaard 2015). The Finnmark Estate also has a role 
in the process, albeit a smaller one (Asbjørnsen 2015; Nygaard 2015).  
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Figure 1.2 Map of Finnmark County 
 
1.4 Methodology 
This research project uses a comparative case-study method. This method combines two 
traditional methods of analysis in political science: the comparative analysis and the case 
study analysis.  In the comparative analysis method the researcher compares two or more 
units of study (Archer and Berdahl 2011). The objective is to explain the differences and 
similarities between the units of study (Archer and Berdahl 2011). In contrast, in the case 
study analysis the researcher conducts a detailed investigation of a single event with the 
purpose of finding general causal principles (Archer and Berdahl 2011).  
 This method is advantageous for three reasons. Firstly, it allows the researcher “to 
explore the relative significance of power as an explanatory factor” (Cashmore and 
Axelsson 2013), because it account for mediating variables. The significance of power is 
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important for understanding the implications of political structures. I explore this concept 
in greater detail in Chapter 2. Secondly, comparative studies are an effective means for 
drawing out the implications of macro-political structures on governance, which is the 
interest of this study (Christensen and Laegreid 1999). Thirdly, subarctic (Northern 
Saskatchewan) and arctic (Northern Norway) comparative work is valuable when 
studying Northern issues because it allows the researcher to step away from the idea of 
Northern exceptionalism5 and “examine the ways that developments in other countries 
help explain gains in their own region or nation.” (Coates 1994:19).  
The larger project that this thesis is associated with determined the two case study 
regions: Northern Saskatchewan and Northern Norway. These case studies made for a 
compelling study because the two regions have enough differences in their political 
structures to provide an interesting contrast, but not so much that there are too many 
external variables to draw insightful inferences. I primarily collected data for the case 
studies through document analysis. In addition to data collection, I conducted 
supplementary interviews with relevant stakeholders and attended a field trip in Norway 
and Sweden and two conferences in Northern Saskatchewan.   
Documents analysed for this research include legislation concerning EIA such as 
CEAA (2012), Saskatchewan’s Environmental Assessment Act, the Norwegian Mining 
Act, Norway’s Planning and Building Act, and Norway’s Regulations on Environmental 
Impact Assessment. EIA policy documents such the Government of Saskatchewan’s 
“Environmental Assessment in Saskatchewan” (2014). Government and industry EIA 
guidelines including the Government of Canada’s “Aboriginal Consultation and 
                                                
5 Northern exceptionalism is “the belief that it [the North] exists outside the realm of 
traditional conceptual frameworks” (Coates 1994: 16).  
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Accommodation” (2011), the Government of Saskatchewan’s “ Proponents Guide: 
Consultation with First Nations and Métis in Saskatchewan Environmental Impact 
Assessment” (2014), and the Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada’s 
(PDAC) “Exploration and Mining Guide for Aboriginal Communities (2013). I examined 
a several sets of documents including scoping documents, environmental impact 
statements (EIS), planning documents, government statements, comments submitted by 
the public, and media coverage for both the Millennium and Nussir case studies. I also 
briefly studied documents and articles concerning proposals for other mining projects in 
the regions of study, notably Rabbit Lake Extension Project and the Gold Heart Gold 
Mine Project in Northern Saskatchewan, and Artic Gold’s proposal for a mine in 
Kautokeino and the now defunct iron ore mine in Kirkenes in Northern Norway, to 
provide context for the two case studies.  
 The type of document being examined determined the document analysis process. 
The majority of documents fell into three categories: guidelines, legislation, and EIA 
documents. I examined guideline documents first. The purpose of reading guidelines was 
to determine the following: legislation that guides the EIA process, the different steps in 
the EIA process, the different actors in the EIA process, and who is responsible for 
decision making. I cross-referenced guidelines that were older than the most recent 
changes to EIA legislation against legislation and academic papers to ensure that 
information included in this study was up to date.  
I examined legislative documents second. I collected information on how the EIA 
processes are triggered and how relevant terminology, such as “development” and 
“environment”, is defined. I examined both CEAA, 2012 and CEAA, 1992 because the 
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CEAA, 1992 was replaced while the Millennium project was undergoing its EIA. I also 
consulted relevant academic works in order to understand how the changes impacted the 
way federal assessments are conducted.  
The final documents I studied were the EIA documents. First, all the EIA 
documents I collected were sorted into the respective EIA steps they were associated 
with. I noted their dates in order to establish a timeline. I also collected information on 
the actors involved in drafting the document. I marked documents that included scoping 
guidelines, EISs, technical reviews, official decisions, information pertaining to social 
and economic impacts, and public comments for a more detailed review. I examined EIA 
documents that had multiple iterations, such as scoping documents, against one another in 
order to identify major differences, such as a change in valued environmental 
components (VECs). I assessed technical documents and public comments (see Appendix 
1) that were available concerning the respective public document to see if information in 
these documents could be correlated to the changes made in the EIA document. I used 
keyword searches to help navigate lengthy documents. I read official decisions and 
studies regarding socio-economic impacts to provide context and information for the 
study. I did not examine in detail documents that did not address socio-economic impacts 
or to key changes identified, such as, “Akvaplan - Marine fish Baseline study” (Akvaplan 
2011). I translated material in Norwegian using Google Translate; a native Norwegian 
speaker helped with some of the ambiguities in the translated text. A considerable amount 
of information was available in English; however, it is important to note that some 
information was likely lost in translation.  
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I along with colleagues conducted interviews using semi-structured format. 
Meticulous notes were taken during each interview. Interviewees were informed on the 
topic of the research project prior to commencing the interview. At this point consent was 
also obtained.  I prepared a set of questions (see Table 1.1) prior to the interviews. They 
were adapted appropriately for the respondents and follow up questions were asked 
accordingly. 
Table 1.1 Set of questions for interviews 
1 Can you explain to me how the environmental assessment process works in 
Norway/Saskatchewan? What is the role of the agency you work for in the 
process? 
2 What works well? What does not? 
3 Are environmental assessment processes helping or hindering socio-
economic development in the area? 
4 Do other stakeholders perceive the environmental assessment process 
differently?  
For the purpose of this thesis I examined a single EIA in each region.  
I chose the EIAs based on three factors: how current the project proposal was, how 
similar the project was to the other case study, and accessibility to relevant documents. 
The EIAs I chose for this study are the Millennium uranium mine proposed by Cameco 
Corporation and the Nuissir copper mine proposed by Nussir (see Table 1.2).  
In Norway, I along with colleagues working on the larger project that this thesis is 
a part of conducted semi-structured interviews with relevant stakeholders in the EIA 
process. The interviewees we selected were based on recommendations from the Barents 
Institute6. The goal was to reach a diverse and relevant set of actors involved in the EIA 
process. Interviewees included a senior environmental scientist working in the mining 
                                                
6 The Barents Institute is an academic institute associated with the University of Trømso 
that specializes in borders studies, transnational relations and northern development in the 
Barents Region 
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industry (Hermansen 2015), a municipal employee who works in land management 
(Trasti 2015), an employee of the Finnmark Estate (Asbjørnsen 2015), a Sami 
government representative (Magga 2015), an employee working for the Sami Parliament 
(Fjellheim 2015), academics researching in Northern Norway (Fors 2015; Eikeland 
2015), and the editor of the Barents Observer (Nilsen 2015) – the major news outlet in 
Northern Norway. In total we conducted 11 interviews in Northern Norway during a 
weeklong period. I also received an extensive tour of Sami Parliament during this period 
and visited three major towns in Northern Norway – Alta, Karasjok and Kirkenes.  
Table 1.2 EIA Project Summary 
Case-study  Northern Saskatchewan  Northern Norway  
Project name Millennium Mine  Nussir Mine 
Company Cameco Corporation 
(Domestic Corporation) 
Nussir 
(Domestic Corporation)  
Mine Underground uranium mine Underground copper mine  
Mine Life 5-10 years 
 
25-30 years 
Estimated employment 136 permanent jobs 
146 contracted jobs 
150 permanent jobs 
Closest community  115 km Wollaston Lake 
(~1, 250 inhabitants) 
7 km Kvalsund  
(~ 1000 inhabitants) 
Start of EIA 2009 2010 
End of EIA Provincial EIA 2013 
Federal EIA on-hold 
2014 
Verdict Provincial approval 2013 
Federal on-hold 
Approved 2014 
Current project status 
(as of February 2016) 
On-hold at request of 
Cameco Corporation 
Approved by Norwegian 
Parliament 
 
Interviews in Norway provided context to the EIA system in the region and public 
sentiments regarding mining developments. Several interviews provided leads on how to 
obtain official EIA documents. Many also discussed how pervasive politics are in the 
EIA process for mining development, and suggested that some actors’ actions were 
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limited by political structures. These insights led me to focus on the political aspects of 
the EIA process to try and find what was limiting actors’ agency. Additionally, findings 
during the field research in Northern Norway, particularly the discovery of the absence of 
an extensive EIA for the iron mine in Kirkenes, led to a change in the Norwegian case 
study upon return to Canada.  
  I also participated in a week-long field trip with the University of Trømso on the 
topic of “Indigenous peoples, resources, and rights” in Northern Norway and Sweden. 
This field trip included visits to cultural centres, research centres, and mining 
communities. It also included presentations from government officials, reindeer herders 
impacted by resource development, an environmental activist, and academics studying 
the impacts of resource development in Northern Norway and Sweden (see Appendix 2). 
The information provided during presentations, in addition to informal conversations 
with researchers, provided supplemental information for this thesis and reaffirmed that 
politics are a major factor in the assessment process in Norway.   
Massive forest fires in Northern Saskatchewan in the summer of 2015 prevented 
us from doing interviews in the area. Two semi-structured interviews - one with a former 
First Nations government employee and academic (Carriere 2015), and another with 
members of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC Staff 2015) - were 
conducted to provide context to the process of EIAs in Northern Saskatchewan. 
Additional information was supplied through correspondence with a senior 
environmental assessment advisor at the MoE in Saskatchewan.  
I obtained additional cultural, political, and regulatory context for this thesis by 
attending seminars given by industry and academics during two separate conferences 
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hosted in Northern Saskatchewan. This included a detailed presentation on Cameco’s 
engagement process with Northern communities, a presentation on how consultation with 
First Nations in Northern Saskatchewan operates, and presentations on the legal 
ramifications of the duty to consult and its impact on industry development. Similarly to 
Norway, respondents were very vocal that politics and political structures impacted the 
assessment process. Unfortunately, none of the interviewees or conference participants 
were familiar with the particularities of the EIA case examined. I obtained the majority of 
the details regarding the Millennium EIA through document analysis. The 
Saskatchewan’s MoE provided me with pertinent documents for the case study, including 
the EIS for Millennium and transcripts of public consultation meetings for the project.  
The number of interviewees in both Northern Norway and Northern 
Saskatchewan represent a small sample size relative to the number of individuals 
involved in the EIAs.  I cross-referenced information collected in the interviews with 
media releases, relevant documents, and relevant academic papers to ensure validity.  
There were not enough interviews conducted to make generalizations based on the 
information collected; however, interviewees provided thoughtful insights and were 
extremely helpful in assisting with the collection of relevant documents. The limited 
number of interviews, particularly in the case of Saskatchewan, did hinder my ability to 
pick on subtleties that can only be achieved by directly collecting information from 
stakeholders, limiting my understanding of agency in the EIA process. The opportunity to 
conduct more interviews would have further enriched my data for this research project. 
I used material released by the media, in addition to information provided by the 
interviewees and public comments in the EIA documents, to gain insight on the public 
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participation in the EIA case studies and general opinions with regards to the projects. I 
cross-referenced this information to check for inconsistencies in the narratives. The 
triangulation of data facilitated a more nuanced understanding of the role of public 
opinion in the EIA process. 
1.5 Thesis Outline 
This thesis has five chapters. The first chapter introduced the topic, discussed the case 
studies, and explained the methodology. The second chapter will cover theory and the 
analytical method used in this study.  It provides an overview of environmental 
assessment (EA) literature and examines how power and politics have been assessed 
within the literature. It also outlines current gaps in the literature. This chapter examines 
the theoretical groundings of Giddens structuration theory and its applicability in the field 
of EA. Finally this chapter discusses the analytical framework applied in this thesis.  
 The third chapter begins by discussing the EIA process in Northern Saskatchewan 
and Northern Norway and the key decision arenas that were identified in each case study. 
It follows with a descriptions of all the actors identified in the case studies, their 
respective roles in the EA process and the different resources that were available to them.  
The last segment of this chapter identifies resources and maps how actors used these 
resources in each key decision arena.  
 The fourth chapter analyses the differences in the access to resources between the 
case studies and correlates them to macro-political structures. This chapter will primarily 
focus on the differences between municipalities, indigenous governance bodies, and 
traditional land users. This chapter also examines whether similarities between case 
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studies are associated with macro-political structures by discussing the role of national 
authorities and members of the public in the respective EIA cases.  
 The fifth chapter will conclude the study. It highlights major findings and 
discusses how they contribute to the literature. This chapter also considers the strengths 
and weaknesses of using structuration theory in EIA and suggest areas for future study.  
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CHAPTER 2: THEORY & ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1. Introduction  
Politics is often defined as who gets what, where, when and how. This familiar definition, 
drawn from the works of Harold Lasswell (1936), is a popular starting point for 
understanding what we mean by the word ‘politics’.  Lasswell’s definition of politics 
highlights the importance of actors and influence (1936).  “Political science, then, is the 
study of influence and the influential.” (Laswell 1936).   
It is often said that “the study of politics is the study of power.” (Cashmore and 
Axelsson 2013). Over the years, theorists have established diverging views on the subject 
of power. Some of the most notable theorists are Arendt, Parsons, Barnes, Bachrach and 
Baratz, Lukes, Giddens, Foucault, and Clegg (Haugaard 2003).  A popular understanding 
of power, supported by Parsons, Luhmann, Barnes, Clegg, Giddens, and many others, is 
that power is created through social order (Haugaard 2003). Scholars refer to this type of 
power as social power – as opposed to natural power, which is the physical manifestation 
of power through force (Haugaard 2003). At its basis this theory supposes that “the added 
capacity for action which actors gain from society derives from the existence of social 
order.” (Haugaard 2003: 90). In this context power is akin to influence or as Giddens 
(1984:283) puts it “power is the means of getting things done”.  
Many political scientists are interested in examining the impacts of power and 
politics on the execution of public policy (Richardson 2005). The idea that EIAs are 
political, and that politics play an important role in resource planning has been present in 
the literature for decades (Beattie 1995; Susskin and Dunlap 1981; Rosenberg et al. 
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1981). In Everything You Already Know About EIA (but don’t often admit) Robert Beattie 
(1995: 112) argues “Because EIAs are part of a decision-making process that has 
distributional impacts, they are, have been, and always will be political. This does not 
mean that they are unfair, unethical, useless, or bad.” Despite EIA being a form of public 
policy, research from a political theory lens is limited (Cashmore and Richardson 2013; 
Richardson 2005). 
2.2 EIA Literature 
EIA literature, which spans over three decades, focuses primarily on three central themes: 
theoretical groundings, effectiveness, and quality (see Figure 2.1) (Retief 2010; Morgan 
2012). These three themes cover a broad range of disciplines in biology, chemistry, and 
environmental science, as well as the health sciences, geography, planning, and social 
sciences. EIA literature also includes sub-fields, which address different forms of impact 
assessment such as strategic environmental assessment (SEA), health impact assessment, 
social impact assessment (SIA), cumulative effects assessment, and sustainability 
assessment. This breadth of study creates substantial opportunities to enrich the current 
scholarship by adopting a political theory lens.   
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Figure 2.1 General Debates in EIA Literature 
 
 Source: Retief 2010 p. 376 
 
The first central theme, theoretical groundings, encompasses literature that deals with the 
foundation of EIA: what is it, do we need it, and what purpose is it trying to fulfil? 
(Morgan 2012; Retief 2010). Common discourses include trying to center EIA within the 
larger political/socio-economic context (Wright 2014; Lion, Donovan, and Bedggood 
2013; Jay et al. 2007; Burton, Wilson, and Munn 1983), questioning the value of the 
rational decision-making model inherent in EIA (Weston 2010; Richardson 2005; Kørnøv 
and Thissen 2000; Elling 2009), and proposing new more collaborative and inclusive 
approaches to the EIA model (Weston 2010; Hourdequin et al. 2012; Öberg, Huge-
Brodin, and Björklund 2012). Some of these studies take radical approaches by 
incorporating theories such as Marxism (Weston 2010) and Foucault-Habermas discourse 
(Aylett 2010; Persson 2006); however Morgan (2012: 8) argues, “there is an abundance 
of EIA literature, and more importantly an abundance of EIA practice, that suggests the 
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centre of gravity of EIA thinking is still firmly rooted at the rationalist end of that 
spectrum.”  
The second theme, effectiveness, includes studies that evaluate whether EIA is 
meeting its goals (Retief 2010; Morgan 2012). This includes examining the value of 
EIAs, their impact, and EIA follow-up practices (Morgan 2012; Retief 2010). The 
findings of the studies vary substantially since they are guided in large part on by the 
author’s perspective of the purpose of EIAs (Morgan 2012; Elling 2009) for example, 
Morgan (2012) notes that some researchers critique the politicization of EIA as a barrier 
to effectiveness (Kruopiene, Zidoniene, and Dvarioniene 2009) while others suggest it 
enables effectiveness (Bartlett and Kurian 1999). In recent years, there have been several 
studies examining whether EIAs are in promoting sustainable development (Nykvist and 
Nilsson 2009; Morrison-Saunders and Retief 2012; White and Noble 2013; Morrison-
Saunders and Pope 2013; Rozema et al. 2012). The general consensus is that EIAs do 
contribute or have the potential to contribute to sustainable development (Pope et al. 
2013; Sheate 2012); however, sceptics remain (Jay et al. 2007; Cashmore et al. 2010). 
Despite the breadth of existing research on effectiveness in a literature review on EIA 
implementation researchers found that “the gap between expectation of EIA and their 
practical performance remains significant.”  (Zhang, Kørnøv, and Christensen 2013: 148) 
The third central theme, quality, focuses on improving the procedural and 
technical aspects of EIA (Morgan 2012). There have been significant contributions to the 
topics of screening, scoping, impact prediction, significance, and monitoring/follow-up 
(Morgan 2012). One of the most studies topics is the issue of public participation 
(Hourdequin et al. 2012; Furia and Wallace-Jones 2000; O’Faircheallaigh 2010; Glucker 
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et al. 2013; Diduck et al. 2007; Lostarnau et al. 2011). Similarly to studies on 
effectiveness, studies examining the quality of public participation, have differing 
suggestions depending on their perspective on the purpose of EIA (Morgan 2012; 
O’Faircheallaigh 2010). Regardless of whether scholars suggestions on public 
participation reinforce the rationalist EIA model or push to a more collaborative approach 
there is an overwhelming consensus among academics that public participation in EIA is 
valuable and seeking to improve it is a worthy cause (O’Faircheallaigh 2010; Glucker et 
al. 2013; Salomons and Hoberg 2014; Noble 2015).  
2.2.1 Power and Politics in EIA Literature 
In general, studies on power and politics in EIA fall under the theoretical groundings 
thematic (Cashmore 2004; Richardson 2005; Cashmore, Bond, and Cobb 2008; Weston 
2010). However, research on power and politics in EIA has also tackled issues regarding 
effectiveness (Cashmore et al. 2010) and quality (Petts 2003; Cotton and Mahroos-
Alsaiari 2015). The research conducted in this thesis falls under the thematic of 
theoretical groundings because it concerns the foundational operations of EIA.  
The limited literature on power, politics, and EIA is split into two categories: 
normative and analytical (Cashmore and Richardson 2013). Normative research explores 
how politics and power should operate within EIA. These studies focus on the public 
participation component of EIA and tackle ideas such as environmental justice, deliberate 
democracy, and knowledge-brokerage. Analytical research examines how politics and 
power operate within EIA. These studies focus on the micro-political dynamics within a 
single case study (Hansen et al. 2013), the limitations of rational decision-making in EIA 
(Cashmore, Bond, and Cobb 2008; Kørnøv and Thissen 2000; Cashmore 2004), 
  27 
knowledge creation (Hayes and Westrup 2012), and conflict resolution (Devlin and Yap 
2008). Despite the number of works listed above, relative to the broader literature on EIA 
and the breadth of work on the study of power, the topic of power and politics remains 
understudied (Cashmore and Richardson 2013).   
There is little understanding of how macro-political structures impact the micro-
politics within EIA. Cashmore and Axelsson (2013), who compared power dynamics on a 
policy developed by the World Bank and its implementation on the project level Dhaka, 
Bangladesh, is the only major study on the topic. They concluded that power, largely 
executed through institutions, played a significant role in determining the outcomes in 
each case.  
Researchers studying the topic of politics in EIA identify public participation as a 
major component of the process in which power dynamics take place (Cashmore and 
Richardson 2013). In the field of impact assessment, scholars view public participation as 
a strong vehicle for contributing to sustainable development because it creates an 
opportunity for practitioners to understand the unique circumstances of a community 
(Sinclair, Diduck, and Fitzpatrick 2008; O’Faircheallaigh 2010). Sinclair and colleagues 
(2018:416) state, “as early as 1995 there was suggestion that participation in EIA is 
conducive to broad-based individual and social learning that could  enable the transition 
to sustainability.” Public participation can identify the particular needs and concerns of a 
community in relation to a proposed project (Hanna 2009; Noble 2015). Valued 
ecosystem components (VECs) are a baseline for evaluating the impacts of a project and 
in turn impact the type of proposed mitigation measures. Determining VECS requires 
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engaging the community because ‘value to a community’ is an important criterion 
practitioners consider when selecting VECs for an EIA (Hanna 2009).  
Research studies have demonstrated that successful public participation improves 
the quality of the EIA and communities’ respect for the EIA system (O’Faircheallaigh 
2010; Glucker et al. 2013). It is also helps industry establish a social license to operate 
(Prno and Scott Slocombe 2012; Moffat and Zhang 2014). Successful public participation 
requires the establishment of open communication lines, trust between stakeholders, and 
meaningful engagement with the communities – not just taking notes of a community’s 
complaints (Morgan 2012; Glucker et al. 2013; Sinclair, Diduck, and Fitzpatrick 2008; 
Wiklund 2011).  
There are many barriers to public participation in EIA. These barriers are divided 
into two categories: structural (e.g. capacity to participate meaningfully) and individual 
(e.g. being unaware that there is an EIA) (Wiklund 2011; Morrison-Saunders and Early 
2008; Bond et al. 2014). Regardless of whether the researcher approaches the topic of 
public participation from a theoretical perspective (Devlin and Yap 2008; Morrison-
Saunders and Early 2008; Partidario and Sheate 2013; Hansen et al. 2013) or a procedural 
one (Wiklund 2011; Sinclair, Schneider, and Mitchell 2012) it is clear that politics and 
power are inescapable. Devlin and Yap (2008: 25) go as far as to suggest that, “Public 
participation will tend to reflect the distribution of social power rather than to alter it”.  
Public consultation has well known challenges: How do you make it meaningful? 
How do you engage with different groups? and how do you incorporate this data into an 
EIA? Suggestions for improving the system are abundant. There are a number of studies 
that focus on identifying systematic barriers in public consultation. Popular topics include 
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impacts of different systems of knowledge, the issues with capacity and communities not 
having the financial means to engage in public consultation, and participatory exhaustion.  
2.2.2 Gaps 
Presently, there is little research that examines how larger political structures and power, 
operating outside of the EIA process and public participation impact the entire process. 
Research to help understand this issue is relatively new (Cashmore and Axelsson 2013). 
More comparative case-studies where the difference in political structures could perhaps 
shed some light on the degree to which these structures impact the role of front-line 
communities in EIA are need to help address this gap (Cashmore and Axelsson 2013).  
What researchers still need to explore in greater detail is the how power operates 
(Cashmore and Richardson 2013). Currently, research on the topic has focussed on the 
impacts of EIA legislation or the dynamics of the relationship between stakeholders 
within the EIA process. What we do not yet understand in any significant detail is how 
the macro-politics of a political structures impact the micro-politics within an EIA. By 
conducting a comparative case study this thesis aims to understand whether differences in 
political structures impact stakeholders access to resources in the EIA, their ability and 
efficacy to participate, and their influence on achieving their goals. This thesis will focus 
on the role of municipalities and indigenous governance bodies because they are the 
primary political actors representing frontline communities.  
2.2.3 The Importance of Political Structures and Structuration Theory  
Political structures play an important role in civil society. This study is interest in 
structures that impact, positively or negatively, the role and agency of aboriginal groups 
and municipalities within the state. These structures include government systems, judicial 
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systems, indigenous rights and governance, and regulation regarding mineral and 
property rights.  
In this thesis, I examine the impacts of political structures on the EIA process 
using an analytical method based on structuration theory.  Anthony Giddens developed 
structuration theory in the late 1970s and early 1980s. His theory proposes that social 
actions can be understood by examining the relationship of structures, defined as rules 
and resources, and agency, defined as interventions taken or considered by an actor 
(Baber 1991; Giddens 1984; Hansen et al. 2013). Giddens proposes that structures 
constrain or enables agency and agency, over time, can alter structure (see Figure 2.2).  
Figure 2.2 Principles of Structuration Theory 
 
 Source: Hansen et al. 2013: 38 
 
The primary components of structure are rules and resources. Rules include 
written laws, such as EIA legislation or constitutional rights, and general conventions 
imposed by particular social systems, such as the value of scientific knowledge and 
empirical evidence (Giddens 1984). For the purpose of this thesis, the ‘rule’ component 
of structure is primarily reflected by political structures. Rules are the means through 
which power is exercised (Hansen et al. 2013, Giddens 1984). Giddens divides resources 
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into two categories: allocative, which are material resources, and authoritative, which are 
non-material (Giddens 1984, see Table 2.1).  
Table 2.1 Resources in Structuration Theory 
Allocative (material) Resources Authoritative (non-material) Resources 
Material features of the environment  
(raw materials, material power sources) 
Organization of social time-space 
(temporal-spatial constitution of paths and 
regions) 
Means of material 
production/reproduction (instruments of 
production, technology) 
Production/reproduction of the body 
(organization and relation of human beings 
in mutual association) 
Produced goods (artefacts created by the 
interaction of 1 and 2) 
Organization of life chances (constitution 
of chances of self-development and self-
expression.)  
Source: Giddens 1984: 258 
Agency, the second key concept in structuration theory is when an actor (group or 
individual) chooses to intervene, or intentionally refrain from intervening (Hansen et al. 
2013, Giddens 1984). Actors in this case study are the various groups and individuals 
involved in the EIA process including industry, governments, municipalities, and 
indigenous governance structures.  
The relationship of structure and agency enables an exploration of what is known 
in social science as the two ‘faces’ of power: the influence of individuals (or groups) and 
the influence of inherently biased social systems (Giddens 1984).  Power, in the case of 
structuration theory, is not a resource but rather resources are media through which 
agents exercise power (Giddens 1984, Hansen et al. 2013). Giddens (1984) uses several 
definitions of power in his work. This thesis uses his most basic definition, “power is the 
means of getting things done” (Giddens 1984: 283). 
Structuration theory is well established in the social sciences and has 
demonstrated its applicability in various fields (Hansen et al. 2013). Social scientists 
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generally view the theory as an integration of two different approaches for studying 
social phenomena: structuralist theory, where cultural and societal structures shape 
action, and methodological individualism, where the agency of individuals shapes 
structure. Researchers have applied structuration theory in a multitude of fields, including 
the health sciences (Hardcastle, Usher, and Holmes 2005; Rütten and Gelius 2011; Chan, 
Deave, and Greenhalgh 2010), public policy (Parsons 1989; Daniel Kipo 2013) and 
environmental policy (Hansen et al. 2013).  
Structuration theory is not all encompassing. This theory, as any theory in the 
social sciences, has its limitations and has been the subject of scholarly critique over the 
past three decades.  Criticisms include the ambiguity of key terminology such as 
“structure”, “resources”, and “rules” (Sewell 1992; Thompson 1984; Turner 1986), the 
inseparability of structure and agency (Kort and Gharbi 2013; Archer 1996; Rose 1998; 
Layder, 2006), contradictions in Giddens’s conceptualization of agency (Korth and 
Gharbi 2013; Loyal 2003), and empirical applicability (Korth and Gharbi 2013; Joseph 
2006; Turner 1986; Gregson 1989). This study addresses these critiques of Giddens’s 
theory by drawing on other scholarly works to clarify terminology and using a previously 
tested analytical framework (Hansen et al. 2013). Despite addressing critiques inherent 
flaws Giddens theory would make it challenging to successfully replicate this study. As 
Hansen et al. (2013:44) explain, “Other researchers could interpret resources, and other 
variables differently.” Another limitation of structuration theory is that it is not designed 
to determine causality. Thus, the results from this study, although insightful, are not 
causal and cannot be generalized. 
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Researchers studying the politics of EIA argue that both structure and agency are 
critical factors shaping the EIA process (Hansen et al. 2013; Richardson and Cashmore 
2011; Weston 2010). Hansen et al. (2013:38) present a strong case for using structuration 
theory as a means to analyze power and politics by relying exclusively on Giddens. Other 
authors (Richardson and Cashmore 2011; Weston 2010) used Giddens’s work in 
combination with other theorists. While the choice of Hansen et al. (2013) to use a single 
theoretical framework has its drawbacks, it makes for a strong analytical framework, 
resulting in a research study that is concise, easy to follow, and produced insightful 
results. Power and politics are complex concepts and there is a strong need for 
researchers to complete nuanced studies on its implication in EIA (Cashmore and 
Richardson 2013). This is why this thesis employs Hansen’s analytical framework, which 
draws heavily on structuration theory.  
2.3 Structural Theory and EIA   
Hansen et al.’s (2013) designed their analytical framework to highlight the dynamics of 
micro-powers in SEA for an aluminum production plant in Greenland. In this study, 
Hansen and her colleagues examined communication, both formal and informal, as the 
resource through which power is exercised. The authors chose to solely focus on 
communication as a resource due to initial findings that communication was the primary 
resource through which actors in the study were able to influence the SEA process. In this 
study, initial findings suggested that actors used several other resources in addition to 
communication to influence the EIA process. Thus, using Giddens’s work defining 
resources this study broadened the scope of resources included in the analysis.  
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 Hansen et al.’s (2013) study found that informal communication was extremely 
effective in influencing the decisions made during the SEA process. The study suggests 
the significance of informal communication may be present in other regions. Due to a 
lack of studies on this subject, researchers have yet to corroborate these findings. Because 
this study uses the same analytical framework the findings have the potential to support 
Hansen et al’s (2013) conclusions.  
 When reflecting on the use of structuration theory Hansen (2013:44) concludes, 
“that ST [structuration theory] provided a useful theoretical perspective for investigating 
the micro-power dynamics influencing how IA [impact assessment] interfaces with 
political decision-making.” Their primary challenge with using structuration theory was 
defining resources, as Giddens’s description is difficult to interpret. This thesis will heed 
Hansen’s suggestions and consult another source (Sewell 1992) in addition to Giddens’s 
work to identify resources.  
This study made two modifications to Hansen et al.’s (2013) analytical 
framework. The first is the omission of social network analysis (SNA) in the mapping of 
actors’ use of resources.  The second is an additional analytical step for identifying 
resources in key decision arenas. Hansen et al. (2013) used SNA to design a diagram to 
map actors’ use of formal and informal communication. Because in this study identifies 
multiple resources using SNA, which is designed for mapping relationships between 
actors, was no longer appropriate. This study focussed on examining which resources 
were available or unavailable to each group of actors in each key decision arena. The 
following is a description of the four analytic steps designed by Hansen et al. (2013) with 
the additional step defining resources (Step 3).  
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2.4 Analytical Framework  
2.4.1 Identification of Key Decision Arenas 
Key decision arenas are stages in the EIA process that involve choices that impact the 
final results of the EIA. I identified these stages by analyzing EIA policy legislations and 
guidelines. I cross-reference the identification of these arenas with information I collected 
during stakeholder interviews.  
2.4.2 Identification of Actors in the Decision Making Process 
Actors are any group or individual with a stake in the EIA process. In this thesis I 
narrowed down the list of actors to groups or individuals who played a role in the key 
decisions arenas.  
2.4.3 Identification of Resources Used in the Decision Making Process 
This step examines data from the document analysis, interviews, and broader academic 
literature and determines which resources were available to actors during the decision-
making process. For the purpose of this study, resources are media through which actors 
exercised power within a key decision arena. This simplified definition of resources 
comes from Sewell’s (1992:9) interpretation that by resources, Giddens implies, 
“anything that can serve as a source of power in social interaction.” Resources were 
divided as per Giddens’s structuration theory into material (allocative) and non-material 
(authoritative) resources. Material resources needed to be tangible, for example funding.  
Non-material resources were more difficult to identify because they are intangible media 
or abstract concepts,  
Examples include scientific knowledge or public opinion.  
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2.4.4 Mapping the Actors’ Use of Resources in Key Decision Arenas 
I identified actors’ use of resources in key decision arenas by examining key documents, 
such as EISs, in addition to information collected during interviews. I then divided 
resources into their respective categories.  Actors’ uses of these resources are compared 
to one another using diagrams (see Figure 2.3). The diagrams also include the outcomes 
of each key decision arenas. 
Figure 2.3 Sample of Analysis Diagram  
 
2.4.5 Analysis of Power Dynamics in Key Decision Arenas 
I conducted a power analysis by examining the different resources accessible to actors 
within a key decision arena and considering how larger political structures impact their 
access. This discussion considers whether a particular resource, or a combination of 
resources, is more or less effective in exercising power. I did this by examining the 
  37 
degree to which actors were successful in influencing the process so that their goals were 
reflected in the outcomes of each key decision arena.   
2.5 Conclusion  
Following a close examination of the literature on power and politics in EIA and the 
merits of structuration theory, it is clear Giddens’s theory provides a useful theoretical 
framework for this study. The importance of structure and agency are reflected in initial 
findings and are identifies as key factors by experts in the field (Hansen et al. 2013; 
Richardson and Cashmore 2011; Weston 2010). Drawing on the analytical framework 
designed by Hansen et al. (2013) gives this study a methodological system for examining 
the data collected from the perspective of structuration theory. The theoretical and 
analytical framework chosen for this study allows for an insightful examination on the 
poorly understood relationship between macro-political structures and the on-the-ground 
execution of EIA.  
 The following chapter will apply the analytical steps 1 – 5 to each case study 
using the data collected during document analysis and stakeholder interviews. Step 1 – 4 
covers both cases at once because the identification of key decisions arenas, actors, and 
resources was comparable in both case studies. Step 4 presents the mapping of actors’ use 
of resources in key decision arenas in Northern Saskatchewan first, and Northern Norway 
second. Chapter 4 covers the fifth analytical step: analyzing of power dynamics in key 
decision arenas. 
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CHAPTER 3: PROCESS  
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter lays out the first four analytical steps described in Chapter 2 using 
information collected in the document analysis and stakeholder interviews. The general 
structure, notably the key decision arenas and resources, were similar in both cases. 
However, key actors, specifically local level actors, had very different access to resources 
in each key decision arena. This chapter focuses on outlining what happened in each EIA. 
Chapter 4 presents an analysis of the implications of power on the similarities and 
differences in the cases.  
3.2 Identification of Key Decision Arenas 
Analysis of key documents in each case study and data collected during the interview 
process confirmed that the general framework of the EIA process in each region were 
comparable to one another (Rust and McLeod 2008; Minister of the Environment 2014; 
Fauchald 2014; NORAD 2003). These EIAs processes draw on international practices 
and standards and is rooted in the United States’ National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) (Hanna 2009; Svensson 2011; Sadler 1996). In each case, practitioners adapted 
the EIA to the meet the particular demands of the individual project in addition to abiding 
by state laws and regulations (Cameco 2013; Sweco 2011). Adapting EIAs on a case-by-
case basis is expected and necessary for having successful outcomes (Hanna 2009).  
There were three steps in the EIA processes identified as keys decision arenas in 
each case study: screening, scoping, and the final approval of the EIA (see Figure 3.1 & 
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3.2). Factors in determining a key decision arena were the number of choices actors had 
to make and the influence of those choices on the outcomes of the process.   
Figure 3.1 EIA Process and Key Decision Arenas in Saskatchewan 
 
Figure 3.2 EIA Process and Key Decision Arenas in Norway 
 
Screening is the first major step in any EIA (Hanna 2009; Noble 2015). It is the 
point in the process when decision-makers, e.g. governments, determine if an EIA is 
required, what type of EIA is required, and who will be appointed as the regulatory 
authorities (RAs)  (Hanna 2009; Noble 2015).  
The second key decision arena, scoping, sets the agenda for the rest of the EIA. 
Practitioners determine what gets assessed, and establish spatial and temporal boundaries 
for the EIA. EIAs cannot possibly cover everything – and they should not; it is a waste of 
time, money, energy and it does not meaningfully improve the process (Hanna 2009; 
Noble 2015).  
 The third key decision arena is the final approval of the project. Government 
guidelines consider this part of the EIA process. Arguably, it is also part of a larger 
agenda regarding resource planning. This is the point in the process were EIAs truly 
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become political as the information in the EIA is rarely the only factor considered in the 
decision-making. I considered this step as a key decision arena for this study, despite it 
being a transition point for the EIA, because the assessment remains a key component of 
the process, the same actors are participating, and it is a key point for determining if a 
project will become a reality.   
Government guidelines single out public consultation as a ‘step’ in the EIA 
process. I did not single it out as a key decision arena because it occurs throughout the 
entire process and is not a point where decisions are made but rather it influences 
decisions throughout the process.  Public consultation is a vital component in all of the 
aforementioned decisions arenas.  
3.3 Identifying Actors in Key Decision Arenas 
Structuration theory defines actors as “individuals or groups with an interest in the 
decision”. In the case of the Millennium and Nussir mine the scope of interested actors 
was large – both have made national headlines. I narrowed down the number of actors to 
be studied in this thesis based on whether or not they participated in the EIA. In each case 
study there were upwards of 20 separate actors. I grouped actors based on their general 
role in society and their respective access to resources within each case study. I identified 
seven different actors: industry, municipality(ies), regional authorities, 
national/provincial authorities, indigenous governance structures, traditional resource 
users and members of the public (see Table 3.1). A full list of all the different actors who 
participated in key decision arenas in each EIA case study can be found in Appendix 3.    
  The first category of actors identified was industry. In each region a single 
company, Cameco Corporation in Northern Saskatchewan and Nussir ASA in Northern 
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Norway, proposed a mining project and was responsible for assessing the environmental 
impacts.  
The second category was municipalities. In Northern Saskatchewan several 
communities (see Appendix 3) were interest in the project and consulted by the 
proponent during the EIA process. However, the majority of community engagement 
focused on two municipalities: the Northern Settlement of Pinehouse and the Northern 
Hamlet of Patuanak. In Northern Norway only the municipality of Kvalsund engaged in 
the key decision arenas.  
The third category -regional authorities- was only present in the Norwegian case. 
Finnmark County was an active participant in key decision arenas. The NAD in Northern 
Saskatchewan does not operate as a unit of government and did not have a role in key 
decision arenas.  
The fourth category of actors identified in this study was national/provincial 
authorities. These are actors that are part of an institution of government that holds 
constitutional authority. In Northern Saskatchewan, the CNSC, and the Saskatchewan 
MoE are the primary national/provincial authorities involved in the process. In Northern 
Norway, the MoE and the Directorate of Mineral Management are the main actors in this 
category. Additional national/provincial authorities (see Annexe 1) such as Fisheries and 
Oceans Canada, and Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries were also involved in the EIA. 
These actors acted as consultants during the EIA on an as needed basis and were 
responsible for ensuring regulations under their jurisdiction are met.  
The fifth category of actors in the EIA was indigenous governance structures. In 
Northern Saskatchewan the English River First Nation (ERFN), the Métis Nation of 
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Saskatchewan (MNS) Local Number 82 (Patuanak) and the MNS Local Number 9 
(Pinehouse) were the primary indigenous governance structures engaged in the EIA. 
Other indigenous governance structures in Northern Saskatchewan (see Annexe 1) also 
engaged in the EIA but were not the primary focus of the assessment. In Northern 
Norway, there is one indigenous governance structure: Sami Parliament. They actively 
engaged in key decision arenas throughout the Nussir EIA.   
The sixth category of actors is traditional resource user(s). These are individuals 
or organized groups whose livelihoods are dependent on traditional economic pursuits 
that the proposed project risked impacting. These actors had a role within the key 
decision arenas that was independent of indigenous governance structures. In Northern 
Saskatchewan, there was a single individual who fit the traditional resource user 
category. Cameco specifically singled out this resource user in the EIA and had one-on-
one meetings with him.  In Northern Norway, the West Finnmark reindeer herding 
management and Reindeer herding district 22 were both active actors in this category. 
This category only includes resources users that were designated formal agents in the 
EIA process. However, it is important to acknowledge that in both cases there was 
additional support for the interest of traditional resource users from the community. Thus 
despite the actors in this category representing a small group of individuals, they had a 
broad base of support helping influence their interests in the process.  
The remaining seventh category, members of the public, is for all the actors who 
did not fall under any of the previous categories. It includes non-governmental 
organizations, private enterprises and individuals (see Appendix 3). In this category are 
all the other actors who had an active interest in the outcomes of the project and sought to 
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have their voices heard within key decision arenas. These actors do not hold any 
legislative authority nor do they have any special rights. In Northern Saskatchewan, 
prominent members of the public included local northern businesses, individuals who 
actively participated in local meetings, the Northern Saskatchewan Environmental 
Quality Committee (NSEQC), and South Central Environmental Quality Sub-Committee 
(SCEQC). In Northern Norway, prominent members included individuals who organized 
petitions, the Norwegian Fisherman’s Association and the Tromsø Univeristy Museum.   
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Table 3.1 Actors and Their Roles in the EIAs 
Role within EIA Northern Saskatchewan 
(Millennium case study) 
Northern Norway 
(Nussir case study) 
Proponent: Actor proposing 
the project, responsible for 
conducting the EIA 
Industry (Cameco) Industry (Nussir) 
Regulatory Authorities 
(RAs): Actors overseeing the 
entire EIA process; 
responsible for ensuring that 
regulatory requirements are 
met  
National/provincial 
authorities (CNSC and 
SEAB)  
Municipality (Kvalsund)  
Participants: Actors with an 
interest in the outcomes of 
the EIA; do not hold a 
position of authority within 
the process  
Municipalities, Indigenous 
governance structures, 
members of the public and 
traditional resource users 
Indigenous governance 
structures, members of the 












Regional authority  
A detailed list of all the actors included in each category can be found in Appendix 3 
3.4 Identification of resources used in the decision making process 
Similar resources (see Table 3.2) were present in the key decision arenas for each EIA. 
The following section discusses the resources, defined as media through which actors 
exercised power, actors had access to in the key decision arenas.   
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Table 3.2 Resources Identified in Key Decision Arenas 
Resource Category  Resource Description  
Material  Financial capacity  Access to notable financial 
resources that can be used 
to incentive other actors, 
hire experts and generate 
scientific knowledge, and/or 
increase communication 
capacity 
Non-material Formal communication Written comments or 
transcripts of dialogue 
during periods of public 
consultation  
Non-material  Informal communication Casual forms of 
communication between 
groups, cannot be explicitly 
traced  
Non-material  Scientific knowledge Hard data built on empirical 
evidence; generally 
provided by a certified 
expert 
Non-material  Legislative authority Legal authority to make 
decisions based on 
government acts or 
constitutions 
Non-material  Land rights Land ownership or specific 
rights protecting a groups’ 
activities on a segment of 
land  
Non-material  Public opinion General public sentiment 
presented through public 
demonstrations, petitions or 
mass media 
3.4.1 Material Resources 
Material resources or allocative resources refer to the variety of tangible means accessible 
to actors through which they exert power (Peters et al. 2012; Giddens 1984). In the case 
studies, I identified a single material resource: financial resources. Actors have the 
potential to use financial resources in several ways in order to exercise power for 
example an actor may chose to finance an independent study thus resulting in the actor 
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being more autonomous in the decision making process and, likely, more legitimate. An 
actor can also use the prospect of financial gains too influence another actor to support a 
decision that without the potential financial benefit the other actor would likely rebuff.  
3.4.2 Non-Material Resources 
Non-material resources, also known as authoritative resources, gives actors control over 
social time-space (Peters et al. 2012; Giddens 1984). These resources are conceptually 
abstract relative to material resources. Non-material resources include organizational 
control. This is the ability of an actor to control time-space dynamics (Giddens 1984), for 
example when and where a particular public meeting will be held, or if a step in the EIA 
process needs to be extended beyond the initial timeline. Communication is another 
authoritative resource. Communication can be informal, e.g. telephone conversations, or 
formal, e.g. public hearings (Hansen et al. 2013). Legislative authority is another 
important allocative resource. This resource demonstrates an actor’s capacity to use the 
law to work in the actor’s favour. Scientific knowledge is also an authoritative resource. 
This resource is useful because of the hierarchical weight it has been given over time. 
Another authoritative resource is land rights. Actors can use land rights as leverage to 
pressure other actors to take their views into account.  The final authoritative resource is 
public opinion. Public opinion is a major cornerstone of western democracy. Actors can 
use this resource to pressure actors whose position of authority is dependent, at least 
partly, on public support.   
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3.5 Mapping Actors’ Use of Resources 
Actors in each case study have several opportunities to use resources in key decision 
arenas. Some actors, such as national/provincial authorities, had a similar access to 
resources in their respective regions. Others, notably municipalities, and indigenous 
governance structures had very different access to resources.  The discrepancies each 
region strongly correlates with the differences in the political structures in each case 
study. The following section explores the individual findings in each key decision arena 
and presents the associated diagrams. 
Northern Saskatchewan Decision Arena 1: Screening   
This key decision arena starts with the proponent proposing a project and ends with the 
Crown designating the RAs for the EIA. Four resources were present in this key decision 
arena (see Figure 3.3): legislative authority, formal communication, informal 
communication, and public opinion. The outcome of the different actors’ use of resources 
resulted in the launch of an official EIA, an agreement between the province and the 
federal government to oversee a joint assessment, and the proponent actively consulting 
stakeholders (see Figure 3.3).  
In the fall of 2009, Cameco Corporation submitted a project description for the 
Millennium mining development to the provincial and federal authorities. The 
Saskatchewan MoE determined that Cameco’s proposed Millennium project fit the 
definition of a ‘development’ under The Saskatchewan Environmental Assessment Act 
and must undergo an EIA (Cameco 2013). Under federal regulation a uranium mine is 
considered a ‘project’ and must undergo an EIA. At the time the EIA was triggered there 
were four possible EIA tracks: screening, comprehensive, mediation, or panel review 
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(Hanna 2009).  The CNSC, which is a federal authority responsible for matters involving 
the nuclear industry, determined that according to the former CEAA1 the project must 
undergo a comprehensive study EA in order for the agency to consider granting 
construction and operating licenses for the future mine (Cameco 2013, CNSC Staff 
2015).  
There was minimal discussion among actors on whether the project required an 
EIA because uranium mines were on the list of projects that require a comprehensive 
study. The MoE could have requested the project undergo a panel review, considered the 
strongest of the four types of review (Noble 2009), had there been pressure to do so. 
However, there was no evidence indicating that actors involved in the process were 
interested in proceeding with a panel review.  
During this time, the CEAA signed an agreement with the CNSC to enable the 
CNSC to perform the role of Federal Environmental Assessment Coordinator. Pursuant to 
the Canada-Saskatchewan Agreement on Environmental Assessment Cooperation (2005) 
the provincial MoE and the CNSC agreed to conduct a joint assessment. Under the 
agreement the provincial MoE is the lead agency and contact for the EIA process 
(Cameco 2013). Cameco, before the process was even triggered, was already engaging 
with members of the public, municipalities, indigenous governance structures, and 
traditional land users in the region to identify parties interested in the project (Cameco 
2013). All these actors were supportive of the project undergoing an EIA prior to the 
governments officially mandating one.  
                                                
1 To avoid confusion the former Canadian Environmental Assessment Act is referred to 
as CEAA while the new act is referred to as CEAA, 2012  
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Figure 3.3 Screening Millennium Project  
 
Northern Saskatchewan Decision Arena 2: Scoping 
The second key decision arena primarily consists of the RAs determining the scope of the 
EIA with the help of experts and the public. This key decision has seven different 
resources (see Figure 3.4): financial capacity, scientific knowledge, legislative authority, 
formal communication, informal communication, constitutional authority and public 
opinion. Actors’ use of these resources resulted in the addition of three VECs to the final 
scoping document (see Figure 3.4). 
Over the winter of 2010, the RAs drafted a scoping guideline for the project 
relying largely on internal experts from federal and provincial agencies, relevant 
legislation and science based policy documents and guidelines such as the 
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End-of-Pipe Fish Screen Guideline (DFO 1995). In both federal and provincial EAs, the 
RAs are legally responsible for drafting the scoping guidelines.  
During the scoping period a funding committee, independent from the EIA, 
allocated a total of $53, 113 to six Aboriginal groups to review project documents, 
engage in community consultation, and prepare a submission to the CEAA with the 
information the groups had gathered. The proponent and the RAs funded their own 
activities. Ensuring indigenous participation in EIAs impacting their traditional territory 
is essential for meeting the Crown’s duty to consult.  
Cameco held meetings with several local stakeholders (see Appendix 4) including 
environmental monitoring program committees that have a large community based 
component such as the SCEQC (Cameco 2013). On May 13, 2010 the RAs released a 
draft of the scoping guidelines. Between May 13, 2010 and June 22, 2010 the public 
could submit comments either online or in First Nations and municipal offices in the 
Athabasca region.  The RAs tried to insure that the public was aware of the review 
process by putting out advertisements on the radio and in newspapers, sending mail outs 
to aboriginal groups, northern Saskatchewan communities, and interest groups, and 
posting information on federal and provincial websites.   
Once the period of comment closed provincial and federal RAs reviewed the 
submissions and made final alterations to the scoping guideline. Additionally authorities 
considered input from industry both formally through written submissions regarding the 
scoping draft and informally through other channels (CNSC Staff 2015; Cameco 2013). 
During the period between the draft of the scoping guidelines (May 13, 2010) and the 
final scoping guideline documents (September 22, 2010) Cameco held two meetings one 
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with the SCEQC and the other with LLRIB leadership informing these groups on the 
technical details of the project and requesting their input  (Cameco 2013; see Appendix 
4).  
A comparison between the original scoping draft and the final document indicate 
that the major difference between the two documents is the addition of three VECs: 
migratory birds and waterfowl; trappers and subsistence users; and air quality. In the 
Record of Proceedings, Including Reasons for Decision for the scoping of the 
Millennium EIA it states that, “Many revisions to the Guidelines were made on the basis 
of the comments received.” (2010:3).  These changes do in fact reflect the comments 
made during public consultation for example ERFN submitted the following (Cameco 
2013, Appendix 1.1, Addendum D: 4-5):  
The list of VEC (valued ecological component) is rather generic. For 
instance a variety of colonial birds nest throughout northern Saskatchewan 
on lakes – including quite small lakes. They generally nest on small 
islands or reefs. If there are extensive beach areas they may be important. 
This type of habitat is used as stopover and resting and feeding areas by a 
wide variety of shorebirds as they travel north and south during spring and 
fall migration. Mining and transportation will create dust and perhaps 
entrain radionuclides into the air. Other VEC no on the list are trappers and 
subsistence users of the area, air quality. Recommendation: include in the 
list of VECs groundwater, migrating birds and water fowl, trappers and 
subsistence users and air quality.  
 
The Crown’s response to the submission stated, “The VEC list in Section 2.6 was revised 
as suggested” (Cameco 2013, Appendix 1.1, Addendum D: 4).  
It is worth noting that the CEAA, 2012 introduced provisions requiring the 
assessment of a project’s impact on migratory birds. While the new act was not in place 
during the scoping period in the spring of 2010 plans to replace the CEAA with new 
legislation were in place since 2009 (Noble 2015; Gibson 2012) thus foresight of future 
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legal requirements may have also influenced the addition of migrating birds and water 
fowl as a VEC.  
 Due to amendments to the CEAA in 2010 there was an additional period of public 
comment posted on the federal website from July 20, to July 29, 2010. No one submitted 
comments during this period. Once the RAs published the final Project Specific 
Guidelines Scoping Document for the Proposed Millennium Mine Project Cameco 
received the green light to begin the EIA on the condition that they address all the 
requirements outlined in the scoping document.  
Figure 3.4 Scoping Millennium Project 
 
Saskatchewan Decision Arena 3: Final Approval  
During this final key decision arena the provincial RA hands over its final report and 
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decision arena (see Figure 3.5): financial capacity, scientific knowledge, legislative 
authority, formal communication, and public opinion. Actors’ use of these resources 
resulted province determining that the project had no significant environmental effect and 
it could move forward on the condition that an environmental monitoring program would 
be put in place (see Figure 3.5). 
There were several draft iterations of the Millennium EIS reviewed by expert 
panels at the provincial and federal level prior to industry submitting a final copy (CNSC 
Staff 2015).  The Saskatchewan MoE determined that Cameco met the requirements 
under Saskatchewan’s Environmental Assessment Act and approved the development 
pending the appropriate permits and federal approval. In a public statement regarding the 
reasons for the ministerial approval the provincial Minister of the Environment at the 
time, Ken Chevaldayoff, stated that Cameco had adequately addressed the questions and 
concerns of local stakeholders in the EIS, that the Crown had fulfilled its duty to consult 
and that there were no infringements on Aboriginal Treaty Rights.  
The Ministry considered the EIS, the technical review comments by provincial 
ministries and agencies and public comments when making the final decision regarding 
the EIA. There were three comments submitted by members of the public, one by the 
Saskatchewan Environmental Society and two by individuals. The Ministry considered 
two comments to be outside the scope of the EIA because they concerned the Key Lake 
operation; the third comment which concerned groundwater, decommissioning, the effect 
of treated water discharge, and the monitoring of northern foods was addressed by the 
proponent in the EIS. Additionally, the Ministry addressed the comment stating that an 
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environmental management program, approved by the ministry, would oversee the proper 
implementation of mitigation measures. 
 The federal government put the Millennium EIA on hold at the request of 
Cameco, due to the inability for the company to move the project forward at current 
commodity prices.2 Thus the federal government has not yet given a final determination 
on the project.   
Figure 3.5 Final Approval Millennium Project 
 
                                                
2 Uranium prices fell from a spot price of 69.5US$/barrel in 2009 when the EIA process 
started to a long-term price of 45.5. US$/barrel in 2014 when the project was shelved. As 
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Norway Key Decision Arena: Screening 
This key decision arena starts with Nussir triggering the EIA process and ends with 
appointing the municipality as the primary RA for the mine’s EIA. Three resources are in 
this key decision arena (see Figure 3.6): formal communication, legislative authority, and 
public opinion. Actors used these resources to influence the proceedings resulting in the 
requirement for Nussir to complete the assessment process and the appointment of the 
municipality as RA (see Figure 3.6). 
Nussir’s proposed mining development triggered the EIA process under several 
clauses of the Planning and Building Act (2009), including but not limited to having a 
surface area exceeding 200 acres, being located in an area important for the practice of 
outdoor activities, potential impact on reindeer herding, a threat to endangered habits 
species and/or biodiversity, increase in peoples exposure to noise/air pollution, and 
potential significant increases in greenhouse gases.  Under this act when a proposed 
project exceeds the 200 acres threshold the municipality can request that the Directorate 
of Mineral Management act as the RA for the EIA on the behalf of the municipality. In 
the case of Nussir the municipality chose to be the RA for the EIA.  
The EIA was legally required regardless of public opinion, however there was 
broad support from Sami Parliament, reindeer herders, Nussir, and members of the public 
for the project undergoing an EIA.  There were no indications that the aforementioned 
actors had a preference regarding the choice of RA. 
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Figure 3.6 Screening Nussir Project 
 
Norway Key Decision Arena 2: Scoping 
In this key decision arena practitioners determined the scope of the assessment and had it 
approved by the municipality. Thee are seven key resources in this decision arena (see 
Figure 3.7): financial capacity, scientific knowledge, legislative authority, formal 
communication, informal communication, legal rights and public opinion. Actors’ use of 
these resources (see Figure 3.7) resulted in the final scoping plan addressing some of the 
concerns stakeholders made during public consultation.  
In Northern Norway, there are three major steps in the scoping process: 
submitting a proposal for a study program; a period of public comment and revision; final 
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requirement of the Planning and Building Act and the RA must approve the plan before 
the assessment process can proceed.  
Sweco, a third party contractor also hired for the impact assessment portion of the 
EIA, drafted the proposal for a study programme. This is a common practice in Norway 
and the company must obtain a general consensus from stakeholders on the hiring of the 
third party before the project can continue. Sweco is responsible for collecting all the 
necessary technical data required for the proposal. The proponent, Nussir, is responsible 
for funding the work completed by Sweco.  
There were 27 submissions of input for the plan made by the municipality, Sami 
Parliament, traditional land users, and members of the public in the three-month period 
between Sweco’s first submission of the scoping plan and the final plan approved by the 
municipality. Additionally, The Office of the Governor of Finnmark submitted a 
comment prior to the first draft. Many of the comments from local/regional organizations 
criticized the technical and methodological aspects of the proposed scientific studies. 
Sami Parliament and the reindeer herding associations asserted their rights to cultural 
practices and heritage in their comments.  The final scoping plan addressed each 
comment individually. There were changes to many sections between the first and final 
scoping plan, including spatial boundaries, biophysical data, and socioeconomic issues. 
These changes correlated with stakeholders concerns.  
Sami Parliament and the reindeer herding districts were in contact with Nussir 
over issues that were of a concern to them during this period of time. During the scoping 
period there was considerable discourse in the media on how to achieve a balance 
between reindeer herding interests and mining.  Nussir’s proposed project was a divisive 
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issue among members of the public and in early May 2010 local/regional organizations 
that opposed the project gathered 221 petition signatures to try and stop the project 
moving forward (Koivurova et al. 2015). In response to concerns raised during the 
scoping phase Nussir invited interested individuals to join a ‘resource group’ to further 
discuss these issues (Koivurova et al. 2015).  
On June 30th, 2010 Sweco submitted the final scoping plan for Nussir’s mining 
development. The Kvalsund municipal councillors unanimously approved the plan on 
July 20th, 2010.  
Figure 3.7 Scoping Nussir Project 
 
Norway Key Decision 3: Final Approval  
This key decisions arena was a two-year long process that included the final approval of 
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development of the mine. Seven different resources, financial capacity, scientific 
knowledge, legislative authority, formal communication, informal communication, legal 
rights and public opinion (see Figure 3.8) influenced the aforementioned outcomes.  
Sweco coordinated the execution of the EIA on the behalf of Nussir. They 
conducted part of the assessment independently (landscape and outdoors activities; 
traffic); however, private companies, non-profit organizations, Finnmark County and 
Sami Parliament (see Appendix 5) executed the majority of the assessments.  
Once the EIA studies were completed Sweco incorporated them into the final zoning plan 
and submitted the plan for a period of public review and public hearings. Members of the 
public, traditional lands users, Sami Parliament, regional authorities and the municipality 
submitted 32 comments during this period. Nussir responded to some of the comments by 
providing additional information regarding the deposits of tailings into the fjord.  
Sami Parliament and the reindeer herding associations issued formal objections to 
the zoning plan due to the impacts on reindeer herding (Koivurova et al. 2015). Sami 
Parliament also expressed concerns regarding the impacts of the project on cultural 
heritage sites. Despite these objections, the community at large was accepting of the 
mining project and the municipal council approved the zoning plan with a 7 to 1 vote in 
October 2012 (Koivurova et al. 2015). 
Objections over reindeer husbandry interests by legally empowered groups, 
notably Sami Parliament and the reindeer herding associations, forced the County  
Governor of Finnmark to send the case to mediation (Koivurova et al. 2015).  Mediation 
between the proponent and reindeer herders at the county level was unsuccessful forcing 
national authorities to handle the issue and make the final decision regarding the zoning 
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plan. The MoE was initially responsible for making the decision regarding the zoning 
plan but due government restructuring after the national election in 2013 the 
responsibility for making the decision moved to the Ministry of Local Government 
(Koivurova et al. 2015). The ministry overruled the objections regarding reindeer 
husbandry impacts and approved the zoning plan in March 2014 (Koivurova et al. 2015).  
The document analysis indicated that the authorities recognized that there would be 
impacts to reindeer herding but considered the economic benefits of the project to 
outweigh the consequences.  
Despite the approval for a zoning plan in the spring of 2014 the development of 
the mine did not start immediately because the Norwegian government delayed the 
permitting process due to questions regarding the impacts of the proposed tailing deposits 
(Bjercke 2014).  During the period of public debate there was a considerable amount of 
criticism over the modelling and measuring methodology used during the assessment of 
the impacts of marine sea tailings (Koivurova et al. 2015). The Directorate of Fisheries 
submitted a formal objection to the project regarding the tailing issue but missed the 
deadline for consideration in the final municipal vote (Koivurova et al, 2015). Mounting 
public pressure over the impacts of the tailings in addition to the objection from the 
Directorate of Fisheries forced the MoE to commission two additional studies on the 
methodology used in the assessment after the zoning plan approval but before the 
Ministry approved the tailings permit (Koivurova et al. 2015).  
Nussir responded to the concerns regarding the tailings, however the government 
continued to delay, reasons unknown, and the permitting process. Local advocates for the 
mine claimed they were ‘victims of political games’ (Klo and Trellevik 2015) . Frank 
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Bakke-Jensen, a conservative Member of Parliament for Finnmark, in an interview with 
the media admitted “Finally, it ends up [being] a political decision” (Horntvedt 2015). In 
December 2015, more than a year and a half-later, the Norwegian government granted 
the final permits.  Unfortunately, by the time the government approved the project copper 
prices had dropped 30%. Unless there are substantial positive changes in the market this 
delay will negatively impact the financial outcomes for the community and developer. 



















  62 
3.6 Conclusion  
Although neither mine is currently in operation both project’s EIAs lead to a ministerial 
approval3 for the mining development. It is evident that in both cases local level actors 
were active participants in the process and were able, to a degree, to influence the 
process. However their roles and their access to resources was not the same. The 
following chapter discusses the political structures that could have influenced this access 
and in turn impacted actors ability to influence the process. 
 
                                                
3 Millennium will also require federal approval if Cameco decides to proceed with the 
project  
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CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS OF POWER DYNAMICS IN KEY 
DECISION ARENAS 
4.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, I use structuration theory to analyze how power dynamics impacted 
actors’ use of resources in key decision arenas. By comparing and contrasting the 
information collected in each case study I will draw inferences on the links between 
macro political structures (see Table 4.1) and the micro politics of EIAs. The most 
striking differences are between municipalities, indigenous governance structures, and 
traditional land users. Indigenous land rights and the delegation of authority are the two 
major macro political structures that influenced the role, agency and power of actors in 
the EIA. The following section presents how these macro dynamics potentially impacted 
the on the ground process of the EIAs.  
4.2 Municipalities  
Local level governments are vital units of government in today’s Western democracies. 
They administer important everyday services and offer opportunities for citizens to 
participate in political life. The reach of a local government’s jurisdictional powers 
differs state-to-state depending on whether a given state centralizes or decentralizes 
power.  The terms centralization and decentralization refer to the degree of powers, 
responsibilities, and freedoms a sub-national government has relative to the state (UCLG 
and The World Bank 2008). Globally, particularly in Western societies such as Norway 
and Canada, there is a trend towards increasing decentralization (Karlsen 1999; UCLG 
and World Bank 2008). 
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Table 4.1 Political Structures in Canada and Norway 
  Canada Norway 
Government 
system 
• Federal parliamentary  
   system 
• Constitutional monarchy 
• Unitary parliamentary  
   system 
• Constitutional monarchy 
Judicial system • Common law (except  
   Quebec) 




• Broad constitutional  
   rights (duty to consult) 
• Signed treaties with the   
   Crown 
• Self-governance through    
   a band system 
 
• Constitutional recognition 
• Special rights for reindeer 
   husbandry; 
• Self-governance, but not     
   land based self- 
   government, through Sami 
   parliament 
• 50% of board members 
   for the Finnmark Estate 
   elected by Sami parliament 
Regional   
governance 
• Division of powers  
   between federal and   
   provincial governments 
• Authority to   
   municipalities delegated  
   by the provinces 
• Municipal governance  
! Limited powers (pass  
   by-laws and control   
   property taxes)  
• Regional and local  
   Authority delegated by the 
   State 
• Regional governance:  
   Finnmark Estate 
! Owns and manages 95% 
    land in Finnmark  
• Municipal governance 
!  Powers include: passing 
     by laws, property tax,  
     primary education, social 
     services, economic and 
     land use planning 
Land and 
Mineral Rights  
• Surface rights private or  
   Government owned  
• Mineral rights owned by  
   the province (with a few 
   exceptions) 
• Resource management  
   provincial jurisdiction 
• Surface rights private or  
    Finnmark Estate 
• Mineral rights owned by  
    the state (with a few  
    exceptions)  
• Resource management 
   state jurisdiction with  
   delegated responsibilities 
   to Finnmark Estate and 
   municipalities 
 
In Canada, decentralization generally refers to the relationship between the 
federal government and the provinces (Mintz, Dunn, and Tossutti 2010; Jackson and 
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Jackson 2005).  The current political trend favours decentralization and, consequently, 
provinces powers have increased over the last six decades (Jackson and Jackson 2005). 
This tendency towards decentralization is not, however, equally reflected in the 
relationships between municipalities and provinces. Municipal governments in Northern 
Saskatchewan, as with all municipal governments in the province, are under the 
jurisdiction of the province and while there has been more devolution1 of powers over 
time to municipalities (UCLG and The World Bank 2008), their autonomy remains 
limited particularly in the North were municipalities are small (Garcea 2005). A lack of 
financial and human resources further strains this autonomy leaving municipalities 
strapped to manage what few responsibilities they do have (Garcea 2005).  
 By contrast, social democratic welfare states, such as Norway, have the most 
decentralized forms of governance among western democratic states, allocating 
substantial power to local-level governments (Sellers and Lindström 2007). 
Municipalities in Norway, which is a form of local governance that has the geographical 
spread comparable to that of counties in Canada, have considerable authority over 
important jurisdictional issues such education and resource management. The financial 
and human resource capacity of municipalities is also relatively high (Sellers and 
Lindström 2007; UCLG and The World Bank 2008). 
 In order to compare the extent of decentralization in the case studies I turned to a 
study by Sellers and Lindström (2007). This study developed a systematic index to 
quantify the extent decentralization experienced by local governments in several 
countries. It quantified local government capacities by examining fiscal and political 
                                                
1 Devolution is defined in this thesis as the transfer of power from a central form of 
governance to a more localized one  
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administration capacities. Sellers and Lindström (2007) scored countries on a 0 – 2 scale 
where 2 represents that highest form of decentralization and the greatest local 
government capacities Norway scores at 1.30 and Canada at 0.42.2 This study supports 
the qualitative findings in this thesis that suggest Norwegian local governments have 
more political authority than local governments in Northern Saskatchewan.  
In the case studies, there was a correlation between autonomy and power at the 
macro political level and the extent of stakeholder influence and participation in the 
EIAs. In both case studies, local level governments had the opportunity to participate in 
the key decision arenas areas in each EIA. However, their designated roles were very 
different. In Northern Saskatchewan local governments had a similar role to any other 
public stakeholder in the process. In Norway the municipality had an administrative role 
comparable to that of the province in the Millennium EIA.  
The Saskatchewan/Canadian EIA regulations consider municipalities to be 
‘persons’ (Government of Saskatchewan 2013) or ‘interested parties’3 (Government of 
Canada 2012). In accordance to EA laws in Canada, public consultation in the EIA case 
focussed on municipalities whom Cameco, in consultation with the provincial and federal 
authorities, considered at risk for bearing the brunt of the impacts from the development 
(Cameco 2013). Cameco did, however, consult with municipalities other than Patuanak 
and Pinehouse. These communities expressed interest in the project, however from a 
legal perspective the proponent was not required to consult with them (Cameco 2013). 
                                                
2 In the study of 21 Western democratic states Sweden scores the highest for local 
government capacities at 1.99 and Australia the lowest at 0.3 (Sellers and Lidstrom 
2007).  
3 ‘Interested parties’ are designated at the discretion of the federal RA and are considered 
any persons affected by the project proposal (Government of Canada 2012).  
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Cameco consulted with municipal leaders and residents through private meetings and 
public events (Cameco 2013, CNSC Staff 2015).   
The municipalities, unlike aboriginal groups, did not receive external funding4 to 
assist them in the EIA process nor did they submit comments during the Crown’s period 
of public comment (Cameco 2013).  It is unknown as to whether this was due to a lack of 
funding, capacity, agency and/or if the majority aboriginal population felt like their 
indigenous governance structures were appropriately addressing their concerns. 
Municipalities were also not in control of overseeing the process, determining whether 
the quality of the EIS was adequate, or if the project would move forward (CNSC 2015; 
Government of Canada 2012, Government of Saskatchewan 2013).  
In Northern Norway, municipalities play a large role in local and regional 
planning. In accordance with the Mining Act, during the screening process the 
municipality has the legal authority to choose whether they would be responsible for 
coordinating the EIA or if they will delegate that role to the national authorities. In this 
case, the municipality chose to oversee the process. This choice gave the municipality the 
responsibility of overseeing public and technical comments during the scoping phase and 
approving the scoping plan.  The municipality also reviewed EA documents and could 
request altercations or additional assessments. It also allowed the municipality to control 
how and when the EIA process would move forward. However, despite having the 
authority to approve proponent’s zoning plan and vote in favour of the mining operation, 
the final approval of the zoning plan moved to the national level because of objections 
over impacts to reindeer herding. Do to public and official concerns over the deposition 
                                                
4 Under participation funding rules for federal EIAs municipalities do not qualify for 
funding 
  68 
of tailing in the ‘virgin’ fjord authorities requested additional assessments and delayed 
the project for several months at the permitting phase. Thus, although the municipality 
did play a larger role in the EIA process than its Saskatchewan counterparts, at the end of 
the day the state could still limit the municipality’s influence.  
The striking difference between the roles of municipal level governance in EIA in 
each country, one whose role is akin to the general public’s and the other who has the 
opportunity to be a RA, is strongly correlated with the level of decentralization in each 
country. Decentralization impacts the level of delegated authority and local governance 
capacity and this in turn affects the ability of municipalities to influence and participate in 
EIAs. For example, the type of legal instruments that govern EIA in each country tightly 
controls the extent of delegated authority given to municipalities in the process. In 
Canada, EIA legislations are independent acts enacted at the provincial and federal level. 
These legal documents designate provincial and federal bodies as RAs in EIAs. In 
Norway, however, EIA legislation falls under broader acts such as the Planning and 
Building Act or the Petroleum Act (NORAD 2003). The Planning and Building Act 
designates municipalities as the planning authority over municipal zoning plans, which 
mining projects generally fall under. The most significant observed impacts of the 
different power dynamic in each case study was the control in determining the outcome 
of the project – where the Norwegian municipality has potential political veto and NAD 
communities do not.  
The different roles of the municipalities did not appear to significantly impact the 
content of the impact assessment regarding local governance issues. Both EIAs heavily 
focussed on the impacts on the local economy including services and infrastructure – 
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especially roads and traffic. Neither impact assessments addressed social issues5, such as 
substance abuse and violence against women, despite their association with the mining 
industry even in developed countries (Shandro et al. 2011; Barton 2002). This omission is 
likely because EIA legislations do not explicitly cover these issues and there was a lack 
of public pressure to address them.  
Differences between the two studies regarding local issues, such as human health 
– where the Cameco study was more extensive, is likely associated with external factors 
such as a greater concern, whether real or perceived, of the health impacts of uranium 
mining versus copper.  
When discussing the role of municipalities it is important to acknowledge that the 
geographic scope of the EA with regards to local governance issues was significantly 
different.  The scope of Cameco’s assessment covered a much larger region and included 
two municipalities: Patuanak (220 km from the mine) and Pinehouse (230 km from the 
mine) – the two are 195 km apart from each other by road (Cameco 2013). The scope of 
Nussir’s assessment regarding local governance issues only included the communities 
within the jurisdiction of Kvalsund municipality (Sweco 2011; Espiritu 2015).  Nearby 
municipalities such as Hammerfest, only 30 km by road and a popular municipality to 
commute to for work (Espiritu 2015) were not within the scope of the assessment (Sweco 
2011).  
There are several likely reasons for this staggering difference in scope, notably 
proximity - there are no municipalities within 100 km of the Cameco’s proposed project. 
                                                
5 The issue of community well-being and violence was brought up by an individual 
during the period of public comment for the scoping guideline and was considered 
outside the scope of the EIA by the RAs (Cameco 2013).  
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And the nature of the project – Cameco is a remote fly-in-fly out site versus Nussir, 
which is within commuting distance for residents of Kvalsund. Additionally, EIA 
legislation in Canada offers more flexibility is determining the scope of socioeconomic 
impacts because practitioners determine the geographic extent of the assessment based on 
the projects impacts on VECs (Noble 2015; Hanna 2009).  
In contrast, in Norway socioeconomic impacts are primarily assessed based on the 
jurisdiction in which the project is being assessed. In the Nussir case this meant that 
nearby communities, such as Hammerfest, who would likely be affected by the mine 
from a socioeconomic perspective, were largely left out of the assessment process due to 
administrative boundaries. Although, the difference in geographic extent of the EA is 
significant it is essential to understand the sociocultural conception of space and distance 
is different in each region.  
In both cases, the developer was keen to engage with the municipality early on in 
the process and in a manner that goes above and beyond legal requirements. It is 
important to consider that obtaining the ‘social license’ to operate in both countries often 
requires exceeding legal standards (Cameco 2015; Espiritu 2015).  This suggests that 
social structures, in addition to legal structures, and in the case of the Norway the 
devolution of powers to the municipality, enabled such a dynamic and allowed 
municipalities to have their concerns addressed early on in the process.  
However, a quick examination of other projects, the Golden Heart Gold Mine 
project in Northern Saskatchewan and Artic Gold’s project in Kautokeino, Finnmark, 
reveals that the same level of engagement with municipalities was not present (ASKI 
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2011;Espiritu 2015)6. This indicates that agency, in this case on the part of the developer, 
played an important part in the politics of the EIA process. Thus, both agency and 
structure shape power dynamics in the EIA process.  
4.3 Indigenous Governance Structures 
Indigenous peoples in both Northern Saskatchewan and Northern Norway had systems of 
governance in place long before the onset of colonization. Over the years, whether 300 
years in Saskatchewan or 1000 in Norway, settlers severely disrupted local indigenous 
peoples traditional, including political, way of life. Today modern forms of indigenous 
governance in each region, for various historical and cultural reasons that this thesis will 
not delve into, are very different.   
First Nations people in Northern Saskatchewan, the Dene and the Cree, elect band 
governments – there are 11 First Nation bands in NAD. These bands govern legally 
protected ‘reserve lands’ were their members live. Systems of regional indigenous 
governance, such as the Prince Albert Grand Council (PAGC), also play an important 
part in the political organization of First Nations people in Northern Saskatchewan. They 
are, however, from a legal perspective an organization not a govment and therefor do not 
have any delegated authority from the Crown. The Métis also have a form of local 
governance7 known as ‘Locals’, similarly to the PAGC they are organizations rather than 
political institutions (Madden, Graham, and Wilson 2005).   
                                                
6 Golden Heart Gold Mine was approved to proceed by RAs (Government of 
Saskatchewan 2012). Artic’s Gold’s project was rejected by the municipality (Espiritu 
2012).  
7 The Métis also have a regional governance system but on the provincial level   
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The main form of indigenous governance system in Norway is the Sami 
Parliament. The Sami Parliament founded in 1989 with the signing of the Sami Act, 
replaced the Norwegian Sami council established in 1964. The act delegates powers 
concerning cultural issues, such as the development of Sami languages, over to Sami 
parliament. The Sami Parliament is also very active in negotiating and advocating for 
issues of concern to the Sami people such as mining.  
4.3.1 Indigenous Governance Structures and Decentralization  
There was also a correlation between decentralization and actors’ power in the EIA 
process with regards to indigenous governance structures.  In the Millennium case, 
similarly to the municipalities, indigenous governance structures had a participatory role 
in the consultation element of the EIA process. In fact, with the exception of a meeting 
with ERFN leadership, the adjoining northern hamlet of Patuanak and the ERFN 
community appear to have had identical access to community consultation with Cameco. 
This is expected.  All residents of the hamlet identify as First Nations (StatsCan 2012). 
There appeared to be more consultation with the EFRN/Patuanak communities compared 
to Pinehouse, which is majority Métis. However, one can draw no inference from this. 
Cameco consulted ERFN/Patuanak because the proposed project is on their traditional 
land (Cameco 2013). They consulted with Pinehouse because they wanted to build a road 
for the mine that would pass through the community (Cameco 2013).  
There was no indication in the public records that members from Pinehouse 
thought that the balance was unfair. One individual from ERFN/Patuanak was concerned 
that consultation with other communities, including Pinehouse, could be used as political 
leverage to push the project through since these communities were supportive of 
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Cameco’s activities. However, there is no indication of such a political motive on the 
behalf of the developer (Cameco 2013) and since the majority of ERFN/Patuanak 
approved of the project there is no way of knowing whether such a dynamic would 
impact the outcome of the EIA or the project.  
Regarding the role of aboriginal involvement in the EIA process, the PAGC 
offered the following insight during the period of public consultation during the scoping 
process.  
“Unfortunately the proposed EA process takes a more “traditional” view 
of aboriginal involvement and input the participation of Aboriginal people 
is viewed more as an add-on or a sub-component to the EA process rather 
then an integral part of the system. While this approach is regrettable, we 
do not believe that it precludes us from raising any issues or concerns. It 
only makes it more difficult for the proponent and the regulators to 
incorporate our thoughts.” (Cameco 2013: Appendix 1.1, Addendum D. 
p.1-2).  
 
Similarly, to the First Nation bands the Sami Parliament also had a participatory 
role in the EIA. The developer engaged early on with the Sami parliament and even 
achieved a preliminary agreement (Espiritu 2015). However the relationship appeared to 
dissolve as concerns over the deposits of tailings and landfill grew in addition to concerns 
over reindeer herding. The Sami Parliament’s opposition to the Mining Act lead to a 
political push to oppose all mining developments in traditional Sami territory until the act 
was changed (Fjellheim 2015).  It appears that in this case larger political goals may have 
degraded the opportunity for a more constructive engagement throughout the EIA.  
Additionally, the role of the Sami Parliament further supports the idea that the degree of 
political decentralization between governance bodies affects stakeholder’s role on the 
ground, as they did not have near the influence or authority of the municipality in the 
process.  
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The impact of indigenous rights was also a factor impacting the role of Sami 
Parliament. During the assessment process itself the Sami Parliament was responsible for 
submitting a cultural heritage impact assessment8 statement to both Sweco, the consulting 
company responsible for completing the zoning plan, and the Municipality. The impact 
of cultural heritage sites was also one of two major issues, the second being reindeer 
herding, that the Sami Parliament has been using to try and stop the proposed mining 
project (Brenli 2013). The Sami’s Parliament’s concern over the landfill and its impacts 
on cultural heritage both during the assessment and during the review process forced 
much discussion on the subject and whether there were any adequate alternatives that 
could be found.  
Sami Parliaments advocacy over culture heritage issues and its ability to influence 
how other parties viewed the subject speaks to Sami Parliament’s legal authority over the 
subject, which was a result of the delegation of powers from the Norwegian parliament. It 
is also a testament to their technical capacity to be able to tackle the subject. There was 
no comparable situation in the Millennium EIA. The topic was assessed and discussed 
with First Nations people but no cultural heritage sites considered at risk (Cameco 2013).  
4.3.2 Land Rights 
The delegation of political powers was not the only macro political structure that 
impacted the power dynamics of indigenous stakeholders in EIA. Land rights also played 
an important role. Nowhere is this more striking than public consultation with ERFN.  
                                                
8 The impact assessment reviewed the two other culture heritage impact assessments that 
were conducted and included remarks of support, disagreement and some supplemental 
information. Sami Parliament was remunerated for this work.  
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Cameco consulted with ERFN leadership and the community on several occasions 
throughout the EIA. The proponent recorded and cross-referenced questions and concerns 
during public meetings, and in some cases private meetings, with the appropriate section 
of the EIS (Cameco 2013). Cameco also hired an external consultant whose role 
according to Cameco was “to go into the communities and collect information by talking 
with leaderships and local lands users through conducting key person interviews.” 
(Cameco 2013:797).  The communities concerns for a local trapper influenced Cameco to 
add him as a VEC and meet with him one-on-one (Cameco 2013). Additionally, there 
was a correlation between comments made by ERFN and the inclusion of migratory birds 
and waterfowl, and air quality in the final scoping document. 
In a community meeting with ERFN/Patuanak, Cameco stated “treaty rights are a 
focus of the environmental assessment” and “we’ve have responded to the pressure from 
your community to protect the environment” (Cameco 2013, Appendix 5.2: 33). An 
example of this was rerouting a pipeline to Moon Lake instead of Slush Lake because 
although more expensive for the developer, there would have less environmental impacts 
on the community (Cameco 2013).  
During the EIA, Cameco did not consult to the same extent, other First Nations 
who from a geographical perspective were closer to project site. A record of public 
meetings9 conducted by Cameco for the EIA includes two other communities (LLRIB 
and Canoe Lake) to the south of the project in addition to Pinehouse and ERFN/Patuanak 
but none to the North. There was indication of private consultation with key members in 
                                                
9 Public meetings are considered a means of formal communication because questions 
and comments are recorded for the public record and could be used in a judicial setting.  
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the communities further North however there was no broad public consultation 
specifically addressing the Millennium project (Cameco 2013).  
In addition to less consultation the SIA portion of the EIS did not include these 
communities in any detail. Cameco’s reasoning for this exclusion was that they had 
identified Pinehouse and ERFN/Patuanak as “priority recruitment communities” and “the 
communities have historic and current land use connections to the area” (Cameco 2013: 
9-4). Land use and treaty rights were the key indicators given by the RAs in the scoping 
guideline document in regards to assessing the impacts on First Nations and Metis 
(Cameco 2013).  
During the period of public comment an individual brought up the concern that 
northern communities who were geographically closer to the site (Wollaston Lake, 
Hatchet Lake, and Fond du Lac) were not going to be included in the socioeconomic 
impact assessment (Cameco 2013). The response of the RAs was to update the scoping 
document so that Cameco had to include the rational for the inclusion of certain 
communities in the EIS (Cameco 2013). There was, however, no request that the 
proponent give a rational for the exclusion of nearby communities.   
An additional major difference between municipalities and indigenous 
governance structures in the Millennium case study is that indigenous governance 
structures qualified for funding for the EIA. Supporting aboriginal engagement in 
EIAs through funding is important because communication with aboriginal 
peoples is a key component of CEAA, 2012 and essential for the Crown to meet its 
legal duty to consult. The duty to consult, the obligation to communicate with 
aboriginal peoples in the CEAA, 2012, and indigenous land rights are all closely 
  77 
intertwined. There was a correlation between funding and participation in 
submitting formal comments albeit there was an obligation when receiving the 
funding to submit comments.  
Thus, treaty rights and traditional land rights were clearly major factors not only 
in consultation with communities but also assessing the impacts of the project. Both 
Cameco and the RAs mention treaty rights and the duty to consult as important drivers 
for focussing on Patuanak/ERFN and Pinehouse (Cameco 2013). This further supports 
the significance of the duty to consult on the role and influence of indigenous 
communities in resource development projects.  
Agency was also a critical factor in the ability of aboriginal communities to 
influence the process. Cameco cross-referenced every comment during post-project 
description public engagement meetings with the relevant information in the EIS and the 
Crown did the same for comments regarding the scoping document (Cameco 2013). In 
some cases, comments, such as the request to add VECs, were directly correlated with 
changes in the EIS (Cameco 2013) for example in a meeting with the SCEQC (June 
2010) an individual asked the following “Are wolves considered as an animal that should 
be added to the VECs list?” (Cameco 2013; Appendix 5.2: 9). In the EIS, Cameco stated, 
“Wolf was added as a valued ecological component through the community 
engagement.” (Cameco 2013; Appendix 5.2: 9). Meetings held post-scoping process were 
more informative in nature than responsive. Cameco simply answered questions 
concerning the project. There was minimal desire, on the part of both parties, to make 
changes to the assessment at that point.  
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  In order to influence the process members of these communities not only had to 
have enough grasp of the subject matter to ask relevant questions during public meetings 
but many also had to actively request to have a meeting in the first place. The meeting 
with the Canoe Lake community during the EIA was the result of a direct request from 
the community to the RA (Cameco 2013). The RAs did notify aboriginal groups with a 
potential interest - it is not clear who these groups were nor what the criteria for ‘potential 
interest’ was - during the scoping process and communities did have the opportunity to 
request a meeting.  
Agency was a critical component for effective community participation and 
influence in the EIA. The proponent only addressed concerns that the community 
expressed, for example Cameco included Slush Lake in the environmental baseline after 
ERFN had request it. Not all communities participated in this process and thus not all 
communities influenced the scope of the assessment. Of the six aboriginal organizations 
granted funding for the EIA by the Crown only three responded during the period of 
public comment for the scoping document. LLRIB also responded despite not having 
funding.  
There are several reasons why certain aboriginal organizations chose not to 
request community meetings or participate during periods of public comment. 
Information collected during the field trip up North, an interview (Carriere 2015) and a 
review of the literature (Booth and Skelton 2011; Chadwick 2013; O’Faircheallaigh 
2007) suggests that capacity, not just financial but also on a human resources/education 
front, limits small First Nations communities. Bands are inundated with requests and 
notifications and do not have the time or the means to actively engage in every process. 
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During the Millennium EIA, community members expressed concern that language 
barriers and communication, particularly in regards to technical jargon, were preventing 
them from being more engaged in the process (Cameco 2013). There were attempts on 
the part of the developer to try and reduce the former barriers, however they were still 
present (Cameco 2013).  
This dynamic is the perfect example of Giddens’s observations on the dualism of 
structure and agency. We can see here that there are opportunities for agency and it plays 
an important part influencing the process but at the same time structural factors such as 
culture (in regards to language) and the result macro political relationships between the 
Crown and First Nations communities (in regards to capacity) is limiting agency. In 
return the active engagement and leadership of individual agents can in part, overcome 
these structural barriers. 
In Norway, the Sami people do not have comparable rights in regards to their 
traditional lands. This appeared to impact their level of influence on the EIA.  According 
to the Sami Parliament, the proponent and RA mostly disregarded their vocal objections 
over the impacts of the project on reindeer herding (Solaas 2015; Brenli 2013) .The EIA 
did consider the impacts of reindeer herder and the issue was sent to mediation at the 
national-level even after the assessment was complete, however the dialogue remained 
almost exclusively between the reindeer herding associations, the proponent, and the RA.  
The Sami Parliament despite its keen interest was left on the side lines (Johnsen 2014; 
Magga 2015; Fjellheim 2015). This is not a surprise considering active reindeer herders 
have land rights independent of the general Sami population (Ulvevadet 2008). 
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In comparison, in Canada and thus in Saskatchewan, aboriginal people have rights 
to traditional resources on their traditional territory even if they are not actively using that 
land or territory and thus the preservation of those resources for future generation was a 
key factor in the assessment process (Cameco 2013). Cameco consulted with both 
community members and the traditional land user over issues concerning traditional land 
use (Cameco 2013). This did not appear to be the case in Norway. In these two cases 
there was a correlation between the political structure of land rights and the influence of 
indigenous governance structures in the EIA process.  
The EIA in the Norwegian case did considerer traditional land use issues (Nussir 
2012), however Sami Parliament as an indigenous governance structure had more 
difficulty influencing how the process was handling the issue than the indigenous 
governance structures in the Saskatchewan case. The lack of land rights as a resource 
through which to exercise power is especially important with regards to mining because 
the industry is inherently very disruptive to large portions of land. EIAs that have a 
demonstrated a significant disturbance to indigenous land rights, particularly in Canada, 
have in some cases not made it through the approval process (YESAB 2014; Werring 
2010; Lambrecht 2013).   
4.3.3 Conclusion 
The similarities of the role of indigenous governance bodies had in both cases further 
supports the findings from the section on municipalities that concluded that the 
devolution of powers from national/provincial governments has a major impact on the 
role of stakeholders in the EIA process. There was a correlation between the degree of 
influence of the indigenous governance systems and the difference in traditional land 
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right in each country. Agency, particularly in the Canadian case, was also a factor in this 
regard.  
4.4 Traditional Land Users 
The influence of traditional land users on the EIA in each case was also different 
particularly relative to their indigenous governance structure counterpart. In the 
Millennium case, the EIA included the traditional land user due to community input 
during public consultation (Cameco 2013). Cameco, along with input from the 
community, identified to a single traditional land user within the boundaries of the EIA 
(Cameco 2013). Cameco privately consulted with the trapper twice during the assessment 
process to insure that there would be minimum impacts on his use of the land (Cameco 
2013). Although the proponent gave individualized attention a single traditional land user 
this user had the same access to resources - land rights, informal and formal 
communication – to exert influence as local aboriginal governments.  
In the case of Norway there was a significant difference in power and influence 
between the Sami Parliament and reindeer herding associations (traditional land users). 
The Sami government was able to influence the process both through public consultation 
and by conducting part of an EA study on cultural heritage. Reindeer herders however 
had more influence in the process and disagreements between reindeer herders and the 
proponent pushed the approval of the EIA and zoning plan to the national level for forced 
mediation. The Sami parliament, despite disagreeing with the plan, was not successful in 
having authorities intervene on their behalf.  
In this study, the legal structures surrounding land rights are correlated with the 
difference in power relationships between traditional land users and indigenous 
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governance structures. In Canada indigenous land rights are more inclusive than in 
Norway were reindeer herders have separate rights from the general Sami population. It 
is through these rights that reindeer herders (which represent roughly 10% of the Sami 
population) were able to exert more influence on the EIA process than Sami parliament.  
4.5 Conclusions 
Similarities between the case studies also suggest that sovereignty and associated legal 
authority impacted the micro politics of EIA. In both countries national/provincial 
authorities had a major influence on the final outcome of the project. At the end of the 
day the fate of the project required approval from national/provincial authorities. These 
authorities not only had regulatory authority, although in the case of Norway the state 
delegated it to the municipality, over the EIA process they were also responsible for 
authorizing operating permits. EIA results are a major factor in getting permits approved 
but, as the Norwegian case demonstrated, they are not the only factor.  The level of 
government influence over the final point of the EA process is reflective of constitutional 
authority.  
There were also notable similarities with the power of members of the public in 
the process. In both cases, members of the public expressed concerns during periods of 
public comment, which proponents were required to address. There was also the 
opportunity to provide technical scientific knowledge, which is also a resource that 
influences EIA, this was accomplished through private companies and non-profit 
community organizations that played a role in providing data for the EA. Members of the 
public also utilized the sway of public opinion to influence the governments’ approval on 
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the project. This was evident in the Nussir case where public outcry over tailings being 
deposited into virgin fjords is correlated with the government’s delays.  
Neoliberalism also likely impacts the process by creating a role for private groups 
to influence the EIA process by providing technical data. The opportunity for the public 
to influence the process through public opinion is reflective of democratic western culture 
were there is freedom of the press and the public holds governments accountable for their 
decisions through the electoral system.  
Evidence collected in these case studies demonstrated that political structures are 
a major factor in determining the power dynamics within EIA. However agency also had 
a role to play. Actors can only use resource if they, as individuals, choose to act. What 
determines an actors’ agency includes a variety of motivational factors, which this study 
did not examine.  There are studies that have examined how agency impacts the EIA 
process such as Kørnøv and Thissen’s (2000) study on rational decision-making in SEA.  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
This thesis demonstrates that power analyses can help us understand key differences in 
the role of local-level actors in EIAs by answering the research question posed earlier: do 
political structures impact how groups in frontline communities influence the EIA 
process, and if so how?  Using structuration theory as a theoretical framework this thesis 
concludes that there is a strong correlation between macro-political structures and the 
influence of municipalities, traditional land users, and aboriginal governance structures in 
the EIA processes studied. Decentralization and indigenous rights were the major factors 
linked to the influence of local level actors in the two cases studied.  
An exploration of power and politics from a single theoretical framework, 
structuration theory, does limit this research. There are other no scholarly theories, for 
example Foucault or Marx, that could examine these case studies from a substantially 
different perspective and likely draw additional, or even differing, insights - such is the 
wonder of political theory. Examining this study from a multitude of political lenses 
would be an arduous task but could certainly prove to be interesting and valuable. From a 
data perspective, the limited number of interviews in Northern Saskatchewan and the 
challenge of accurately translating Norwegian documents created gaps in the data 
analysis which in turn impacted the results of this study. Results would have been 
stronger had their been the opportunity to collect more data for this study.  
By using the comparative study method in combination with structuration theory 
this study was able to investigate how macro-political structures shape the micro-politics 
of the EIAs in this study. This led to identifying two key structures - land rights and 
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decentralization - that deeply impacted the agency of local-level actors in the EIA 
process. This suggests that policy makers and those interested in improving the EIA 
process need to look beyond the internal workings of EIA if they want to see substantial 
changes with regards to the participation and the role of local-level actors. This finding 
supports other studies (Runhaar and Harts 2015; O’Faircheallaigh 2010) that suggest 
researchers and practitioners need to examine external institutional structures in order to 
improve the EIA system.  
 The study also reinforces the idea that agency is critical in order for stakeholders 
to participate meaningfully in the EIA process and that political structures are not the 
only factor linked to the influence of stakeholders in the EIA process. Structural 
advantages, for example land rights, are only useful if actors use these resources to 
advocate for themselves; for example, in the Saskatchewan case when community 
members requested that Cameco add the trapper as a VEC. Conversely, structural 
disadvantages, such as the Sami’s shortage of land rights, will continue to perpetuate 
within the system unless actors, locally and nationally, choose to intervene with the status 
quo. Actors need to be savvy and engaged in order to actively take advantage of all the 
resources available to them, such as the Sami Parliament focussing on cultural heritage 
rights, to try and compensate for certain structural barriers. Thus, agency is critical for the 
engagement of local-level actors in EIA. The system can support the agency of local-
level actors by reducing barriers such as capacity. This echoes the opinions of many 
researchers and advocates in the field of EIA who believe that financial support and 
education are essential to meaningful participation.  
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A particularly interesting point for further study that this thesis highlights is the 
relationship between decentralization and the role and influence of actors. It would be 
extremely valuable to examine a large number of cases, both within a single state and 
between different states, to see if this observation proved to be true in other cases. There 
is already a considerable amount of work done on quantifying decentralization therefor a 
study on decentralization and EIA could be done quantitatively as well as qualitatively.  
 The use of structuration theory in this thesis suggests that improving EIA requires 
much more than policy tweaks and improving best practices. The EIA process is not 
isolated from the larger, macro-political structures; if we do not understand how these 
structures influence EIA processes, we run the risk of advancing policy changes that 
simply may not work. Indigenous land rights may have a far greater impact on local 
actors’ agency in EIA processes, for instance, than changing public participation 
requirements. Effective and meaningful solutions require not only looking within EIA 
processes, but also looking outwards towards the larger macro-political structures.   
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Appendix 1 – Documents Included in Document Analysis 
Document 
Type 
Title  Source Date 





EIA Document Technical Review Comments 
Environmental Impact Statement 







EIA Document Golden Heart Gold Mine Project 






EIA Document Rabbit Lake Tailings North Pit 







EIA Document  Notice of Adjournment of Public 
Hearing - Millennium Mine 
Project 
CEAA 06/09/2014 
EIA Document  Public Notice - Environmental 
Impact Assessment Notice 
CEAA 10/18/2013 
EIA Document  Order Designating the 
Millennium Mine Project 
CEAA 10/07/2013 
EIA Document  Funding Review Committee's 
Report (Aboriginal Funding 
Envelope - Phase II) 
CEAA 10/15/2010 
EIA Document  Final Project Specific Guidelines 
Scoping Document for the 
Proposed Millennium Mine 
Project 
CEAA 09/22/2010 
EIA Document  Record of Proceedings, Including 
Reasons for Decision - Cameco 
Corporation - Project Specific 
Guidelines Scoping Document 
for the Proposed Millennium 
Mine Project  
CEAA 09/22/2010 
EIA Document  Public Comments Invited on the 
Project and Conduct of the 
Comprehensive Study 
CEAA 07/19/2010 
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EIA Document  Notice of Commencement of an 
Environmental Assessment  
CEAA 07/19/2010 
EIA Document  Funding Review Committee's 
Report (Aboriginal Funding 
Envelope)  
CEAA 05/20/2010 
EIA Document  Availability of $20,000 to 
Participate in the Environmental 
Assessment 
CEAA 05/14/2010 
EIA Document  Draft Project-Specific Guidelines 
Scoping Document  
CEAA 05/13/2010 
EIA Document  Request for Public Input into the 
Environmental Assessment  
CEAA 05/13/2010 





EIA Document  Province of Saskatchewan 
Ministry of Environment 
Ministerial Approval Pursuant to 
Section 15(1)(a) The 
Environmental Assessment Act, 







EIA Document  Reasons For Decision Ministerial 
Approval Pursuant to Section 
15(1)(a) The Environmental 
Assessment Act, Cameco 


















EIA Document  Appendices Millennium Project 






EIA Document  Technical Review Comments on 
the Environmental Impact 
Statement Cameco Corporation 






EIA Document  Kvalsund Municipality Approved Nussir 06/30/2010 
  89 
Scoping Plan  
EIA Document  Kvalsund Municipality - 
Municipal Council Scoping Plan 
Protocol  
Nussir 05/12/2010 
EIA Document  Sweco - Suggestion for Scoping 
Plan 
Nussir 03/25/2010 
EIA Document  Norwegian Food Safety Program 
(Input for Scoping Plan)  
Nussir 12/10/2010 
EIA Document  Fiskarlaget (Input for Scoping 
Plan)  
Nussir 12/07/2010 
EIA Document  Environmental department (Input 
for Scoping Plan)  
Nussir 06/28/2010 
EIA Document  The Directorate of Mineral 
Management (Input for Scoping 
Plan)  
Nussir 06/18/2010 
EIA Document  West Finnmark reindeer herding 
management (Input for Scoping 
Plan)  
Nussir 05/26/2010 
EIA Document  Kvalsund Municipality (Input for 
Scoping Plan)  
Nussir 05/19/2010 
EIA Document  Reindeer herding district 22 
(Input for Scoping Plan)  
Nussir 05/16/2010 
EIA Document  Repparfjord Land Owner 
Association (Input for Scoping 
Plan)  
Nussir 05/10/2010 
EIA Document  Kysverket (Input for Scoping 
Plan)  
Nussir 05/10/2010 
EIA Document  Jørgen Kleivan (Input for 
Scoping Plan) 
Nussir 05/10/2010 
EIA Document  Institute of Marine Research 
(Input for Scoping Plan)  
Nussir 05/10/2010 
EIA Document  The Sami People's Association 
(Input for Scoping Plan)  
Nussir 05/09/2010 
EIA Document  The Coastal Fishers (Input for 
Scoping Plan)  
 
Nussir 05/09/2010 
EIA Document  Klubben and Environs Local 
Association (Input for Scoping 
Plan) 
Nussir 05/09/2010 
EIA Document  Jonny Olsen (Input for Scoping 
Plan)  
Nussir 05/09/2010 
EIA Document  Norwegian Water Resources and 
Energy Directorate (Input for 
Scoping Plan) 
Nussir 05/07/2010 
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EIA Document  Climate and Pollution Agency 
(Input for Scoping Plan) 
Nussir 05/07/2010 
EIA Document  The Directorate of Mineral 
Management (Input for Scoping 
Plan) 
Nussir 05/07/2010 
EIA Document  Norway's Hunting and Fishing 
Association Finnmark (Input for 
Scoping Plan) 
Nussir 05/06/2010 
EIA Document  Halsvik Aggregates (Input for 
Scoping Plan) 
Nussir 05/06/2010 
EIA Document  Forum for Nature and Outdoor 
recreation Finnmark (Input for 
Scoping Plan) 
Nussir 05/06/2010 
EIA Document  The Office of the Governor of 
Finnmark (Input for Scoping 
Plan) 
Nussir 05/05/2010 
EIA Document  Finnmark County Government  
(Input for Scoping Plan) 
Nussir 05/05/2010 
EIA Document  Lars Haugen and Family (Input 
for Scoping Plan)  
Nussir 05/04/2010 
EIA Document  Tromsø University Museum 
(Input for Scoping Plan)  
Nussir 04/29/2010 
EIA Document  Misc Neighbours (Input for 
Scoping Plan)  
Nussir 04/28/2010 
EIA Document  Directorate of Fisheries (Input for 
Scoping Plan)  
Nussir 04/09/2010 
EIA Document  The Norwegian Public Roads 
Administration (Input for 
Scoping Plan)  
Nussir 04/07/2010 
EIA Document  Oluf Holmgren (Input for 
Scoping Plan)  
Nussir 04/07/2010 
EIA Document  The Office of the Governor of 
Finnmark's preliminary input 
(Input for Scoping Plan)  
Nussir 02/09/2010 
EIA Document  Akvaplan-Marine Baseline study Nussir  06/14/2011 
EIA Document  Akvaplan - Marine fish Baseline 
study  
Nussir 06/07/2011 
EIA Document  Akvaplan - Marine Fish EIA 
study  
Nussir  05/07/2011 
EIA Document  Akvaplan - Tailings deposit 
marine life EIA study 
Nussir 06/01/2011 
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EIA Document  Bedriftskompetanse - Social 
issues ESIA study  
Nussir  05/12/2011 
EIA Document  Bergfald - Alternative use of 
tailings EIA study  
Nussir 05/12/2011 
EIA Document  Finnmark County - Cultural 
heritage ESIA study  
Nussir  11/22/2010 
EIA Document  NIKU Cultural heritage ESIA 
Study  
Nussir 12/10/2009 
EIA Document  NIKU - Seasami ESIA Study  Nussir  03/30/2011 
EIA Document  NIVA - Freshwater Baseline 
Study  
Nussir 04/18/2011 
EIA Document  NIVA - Landfill EIA Study  Nussir  05/12/2011 
EIA Document  NIVA - Salmon EIA Study  Nussir 05/30/2011 
EIA Document  NORUT - Reindeer herding 
ESIA Study  
Nussir  04/15/2011 
EIA Document  NTNU - Physical Chemical 
properties Tailing EIA Study  
Nussir 05/17/2011 
EIA Document  Smetinget - Cultural heritage 
ESIA Study  
Nussir  04/13/2011 
EIA Document  SINTEF - Recycling tailings 
ESIA study  
Nussir 05/16/2011 
EIA Document  SWECO - Landscape and 
outdoor activities 
Nussir  05/25/2011 
EIA Document  SWECO - Traffic (ex. maps) Nussir 04/26/2011 
EIA Document  SWECO - Traffic (w. maps -28 
MB) 
Nussir  04/26/2011 
EIA Document  Letter to the Ombudsman - 
Zoning plan complaint 
Nussir  04/04/2014 
EIA Document  Ministry of Local Government - 
Nussir Decision  
Nussir 03/20/2014 
EIA Document  County Governor of Finnmark's 
submission letter 
Nussir  11/30/2012 
EIA Document  Kvalsund minicipality - Case 
80/12 
Nussir 10/25/2012 
EIA Document  Kvalsund Municipality - main 
minutes 
Nussir  20/25/2012 
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EIA Document  Sweco Zoning Plan submission 
letter 
Nussir  06/03/2011 
EIA Document  Zoning Plan with ESIA studies Nussir 06/03/2011 
EIA Document  Map A Nussir  06/03/2011 
EIA Document  Map B Nussir 06/03/2011 
EIA Document  Ventilation  Nussir  05/24/2013 
EIA Document  Adjusted outlet of tailings  Nussir  04/16/2012 
EIA Document  Depths in the Tailings Deposit Nussir 03/27/2012 
EIA Document  Faegfjordholmen Tailings 
Deposit  
Nussir  03/18/2012 
EIA Document  Flotation Chemicals Nussir 02/24/2012 
EIA Document  Reply from Akvaplan to 
Commentaries 
Nussir  11/18/2011 
EIA Document  Reply from NIVA to 
Commentaries 
Nussir  10/05/2011 
EIA Document  Directorate of Fisheries - 
Correction (Commentaries)  
Nussir 12/02/2011 
EIA Document  Directorate of Fisheries - New 
Commentary (Commentaries)  
Nussir  11/25/2011 
EIA Document  NVE (Commentaries)  Nussir 09/20/2011 
EIA Document  The Norwegian Society for the 
Conservation of Nature 
(Commentaries)  
Nussir  09/15/2011 
EIA Document  Coastal Fishers - Kvalsund 
branch (Commentaries)  
Nussir  09/15/2011 
EIA Document  Institute of Marine Research 
(Commentaries)  
Nussir 09/15/2011 
EIA Document  Sami Parliament (Commentaries)  Nussir  09/14/2011 
EIA Document  District 22 (Commentaries)  Nussir 09/14/2011 
EIA Document  Fishers of Norway 
(Commentaries)  
Nussir  09/14/2011 
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EIA Document  The Green Environmental Party 
Finnmark (Commentaries)  
Nussir  09/14/2011 
EIA Document  Forum for Nature and Outdoor 
recreation in Finnmark 
(Commentaries)  
Nussir 09/14/2011 
EIA Document  Governors Office of Finnmark 
County Environmental 
Department (Commentaries)  
Nussir  09/09/2011 
EIA Document  Directorate of Fisheries 
(Commentaries)  
Nussir 09/08/2011 
EIA Document  University of Tromsø 
(Commentaries)  
Nussir  09/07/2011 
EIA Document  District 22 (Commentaries)  Nussir  09/07/2011 
EIA Document  Mihkkal Niilasa siida 
(Commentaries)  
Nussir 09/07/2011 
EIA Document  Salmonrivewrs of Finnmark 
(Commentaries)  
Nussir  09/07/2011 
EIA Document  Headline (Commentaries)  Nussir 09/07/2011 
EIA Document  West - Finnmark Hunter and 
Fisher Assocation 
(Commentaries)  
Nussir  09/06/2011 
EIA Document  NPRA (Commentaries)  Nussir  09/06/2011 
EIA Document  Repparfjord Eiendom 
(Commentaries)  
Nussir 09/06/2011 
EIA Document  Per Ole Israelsen (Commentaries)  Nussir  09/06/2011 
EIA Document  Norwegian Saami Association 
(Commentaries)  
Nussir 09/06/2011 
EIA Document  Norwegian Food Safety 
Authority (Commentaries)  
Nussir  09/06/2011 
EIA Document  Socialist Left Party of Norway - 
Finnmark  (Commentaries)  
Nussir  09/06/2011 
EIA Document  The Reindeer Herding 
Management of West - Finnmark 
(Commentaries)  
Nussir 09/05/2011 
EIA Document  Repparfjord Landowners 
(Commentaries)  
Nussir  08/31/2011 
EIA Document  Directorate of Mining 
(Commentaries)  
Nussir 08/31/2011 
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EIA Document  Finnmark County Cultural 
Heritage (Commentaries)  
Nussir  08/25/2011 
EIA Document  The Finnmark Property 
(Commentaries)  
Nussir  08/25/2011 




EIA Document  Hammerfest municipality 
(Commentaries)  
Nussir  07/15/2011 
EIA Document Comments on objection letter in 
connection with the zoning plan 
for mining 
Nussir 02/13/15 






Guidelines Proponents Guide: Consultation 
with First Nations and Métis 




















Guidelines Guidelines for the Preparation of 











Guidelines Codification of Current Practice: 
Canadian Nuclear Safety 
CNSC 08/2011 




Commitment to Aboriginal 
Consultation  
Guidelines Environmental Impact 
Assessment  
NORAD 2003 
Guidelines  Exploration and Mining Guide 
for Aboriginal Communities  
PDAC 2013 
Legislation  Canadian Environmental 




Legislation  Canadian Environmental 




Legislation  Environmental Assessment Act  Government of 
Saskatchewan  
2013 





Legislation  Finnmark Act  Government of 
Norway  
2005 
Legislation  Planning and Building Act  Government of 
Norway  
2003 
Legislation  Regulations on Environmental 
Impact Assessment for plans 
pursuant to the Norwegian 




Other Fact Sheet - Uranium Mining and 
Milling: The Facts on a Well-







Process Diagram: Environmental 
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Appendix 2. Field School Presentations 
Date Location  Topic(s) Speaker 
04/27/2015 Snåsa, Norway  The role of an elective 
representative in Norwegian 
Sámi Parliament, legislative 
issues with reindeer herding and 
animals of prey, relationship 
between Sámi and the 
Norwegian Parliament  
Thomas 
Åhren 
04/27/2015 Snåsa, Norway  Role of representing Sámi in the 






Hattfjeldall Sámi School and the 








The role of Sitji Jarnge South 










Local activist campaign“Stoppa 
gruvan i Rönnbäcken” and the 
speaker's entrepreneurial 









Collaborative research in 






























Appendix 3. List of Actors identified in Key Decision Arenas 
Actors Millennium Mine Nussir Mine  
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Proponent Cameco Corporation Nussir ASA 
Municipalities Northern Settlement of 
Pinehouse 
 
Northern Hamlet of 
Patuanak  
 
Northern Hamlet of Stony 
Rapids  
 
Northern Settlement of 
Wollaston Lake 
 
Northern Settlement of 
Uranium City  
 
Northern Settlement of 
Camsell Portage 
Kvalsund Municipality 
Regional agencies  Finnmark County 
Government 
 
























Canadian Nuclear Safety 




























Resources and Energy 
Directorate 
 
Climate and Pollution 
Agency 
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Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Agency  
The Norwegian Public 
Roads Administration 
Aboriginal governments English River First Nations 
(ERFN) 
 
Lac La Ronge Indian Band 
(LLRIB)  
 
Hatchet Lake Denesuline 
First Nation 
 
Black Lake Denesuline 
First Nation  
 
Fond du Lac Denesuline 
First Nation  
 
Métis Nation of 
Saskatchewan (MNS) Local 
Number 82 (Patuanak) 
 


















Sami People’s association 
 
West Finnmark reindeer 
herding management 
 
Reindeer herding district 22 
Members of the Public: 
Non-governmental, 






Members of the Public: 
Non-governmental, 






Athabasca Working Group 
 
Local Northern Businesses 
 
Northern Labour Market 
Committee 
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Klubben and Environs 
Local Association 
 








Lars Haugen and family 
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Appendix 4. Cameco’s Public Participation Meetings 
Meeting Location Date RAs in attendance 
NSEQC La Ronge Jun-08  
ERFN Chief and 
Council 
N/A Oct-08  
NSEQC La Ronge Dec-09  
NSEQC La Ronge Mar-09  
SCEQC Key Lake 
Site 
May-09 Federal and provincial  
ERFN Leadership Saskatoon May-09  
NSEQC La Ronge Jun-09  
NSEQC La Ronge Nov-09  








Saskatoon Apr-10 Federal 
SCEQC Key Lake 
Site 
Jun-10 Federal  
LLRIB Chief and 
Council  
Saskatoon Sep-10  





Oct-10 Federal and provincial  
NSEQC La Ronge Nov-10  
AWG Saskatoon Mar-11  
NSEQC La Ronge Mar-11  





Oct-11 Federal and provincial  
NSEQC La Ronge Jun-11  
Trapper/Resource User Saskatoon Jul-11  
SCEQC  Saskatoon Jul-11  
NSEQC Meeting La Ronge Nov-11  
NSEQC Meeting La Ronge Jun-12  
ERFN EQC Saskatoon Jul-12  
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Trapper/Resource User La Ronge Jul-12  
SCEQC La Ronge Jul-12  






NSEQC La Ronge Oct-12  
AWG  Prince Albert Dec-12  
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Appendix 5 – Organizations responsible for an EIA study for 
the Nussir Project 
 
Organization  EIA study  
Akvaplan – Nowergian consulting 
company specializes in aquaculture 
and northern environments 
(Subsidiary of NIVA)  
Marine Fish 
 
Tailings deposit marine life 
Bedriftskompetanse – Northern 
Norway Development Group 
Social Issues 
Bergfald – Norwegian Environmental 
Consulting company  
Alternative use of tailings 
Finnmark County Cultural Heritage 
NIKU – Norwegian Institute for 





NIVA  - Norwegian Institute for 




NORUT – Norwegian northern 
research organization  
Reindeer Herding  
NTNU – Norwegian Univeristy of 
Science and Technology  
Physical Chemical properties Tailing  
Sametinget -Sami Parliament  Cultural Heritage 
SINTEF – Largest independent 
research organization in Scandinavia 
Recycling tailings  
SWECO – Europe’s largest 
environmental consulting company 
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